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Sorry, No Remedy: Intersectionality and the 
Grand Irony of ERISA 
Paul M. Secunda* 
“[T]he combination [of the employee’s] state cause of action [being] 
preempted by ERISA even while ERISA denies him any alternative 
remedy . . . is disappointingly pernicious to the very goals and desires 
that motivated Congress to enact pension laws in the first place.”1 
— Judge Stanley F. Birch, Jr. 
 
Congress enacted the Employee Retiree Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) to protect 
employees’ retirement and welfare benefits. Nevertheless, the Act has been interpreted by 
the U.S Supreme Court over the years to be in essence an Employers’ Security Act, with 
employers using ERISA to shield themselves against employee benefits-related claims. 
The flaw in the current ERISA scheme lies at the intersection of ERISA’s preemption and 
remedial provisions. Courts broadly interpret the preemption provisions of ERISA to 
invalidate employee benefits-related state laws and then force employees to depend on an 
inadequate, “comprehensive and reticulated” remedial scheme. This “intersectionality” 
problem leads to a state of affairs that is contrary to ERISA’s purpose of protecting the 
interests of participants and beneficiaries by “providing for appropriate remedies, 
sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.” To cure what currently ails ERISA, 
this Article proposes three alternative reforms—one judicial and two legislative. The 
judicial approach would call for the Court to adopt a remedialist approach, which would 
be in line both with Congress’s intent to incorporate most of the common law of trusts 
into ERISA, and also consistent with a modern interpretation of a remedial statute. 
Additionally, Congress should reexamine and reject the far-fetched analogy between 
ERISA, enacted in 1974, and the “days of the divided bench” analysis and provide an 
express and expansive definition for “appropriate equitable relief” under proposed 
section 3(43). Finally, Congress should pass an ERISA Civil Rights Act under proposed 
section 502(a)(11), which, like the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in the Title VII context, would 
permit capped, compensatory, and punitive damage awards in appropriate cases. 
 
 * Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. An earlier draft of this Article 
was presented as part of the 2009 Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal Symposium, The Grand 
Irony of ERISA?: Intersectionality of ERISA Preemption and Remedial Issues. For their helpful 
suggestions on this paper, I would like to thank Debra Davis, Albert Feuer, Stephen D. Rosenberg, 
Susan Harthill, and Paul Mollica. 
 1. Sanson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 966 F.2d 618, 625 (11th Cir. 1992) (Birch, J., dissenting). 
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Introduction 
 Congress enacted the Employee Retiree Income Security Act of 
1974 (ERISA or “the Act”)2 to protect employees’ retirement and 
welfare benefits.3 Nevertheless, the Act has been interpreted by the U.S. 
Supreme Court over the years to be in essence an Employers’ Security 
Act, with employers using ERISA to shield themselves against employee 
benefits-related claims.4 
The flaw in the current ERISA scheme lies at the intersection of 
ERISA’s preemption and remedial provisions. Courts broadly interpret 
the preemption provisions of ERISA under section 514 to invalidate 
benefits-related state laws and then force employees to depend on an 
inadequate, “comprehensive and reticulated”5 remedial scheme under 
section 502(a). This intersectionality problem leads to a state of affairs 
that is contrary to ERISA’s purpose of protecting the interests of 
participants and beneficiaries “by providing for appropriate remedies, 
sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.”6 
The Court has accomplished this feat of perverting congressional 
intent by choosing to elevate a secondary purpose of ERISA over its 
primary one. While the primary purpose of ERISA is clearly stated in 
the Act to be the protection of employees’ benefits,7 the Court has 
 
 2. ERISA §§ 2–4402, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2006). Following the practice of other ERISA 
scholarship, the text of this Article refers to the original section numbers as enacted by ERISA, rather 
than to the United State Code section numbers. 
 3.  Section 2 of ERISA contains the “findings and declarations of policy.” Specifically, it states: 
“It is hereby declared to be the policy of [the Act] to protect interstate commerce and the interests of 
participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 1101(b); see Boggs v. 
Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 845 (1997) (“The principal object of the statute is to protect plan participants and 
beneficiaries.”); Mass. v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 112 (1989) (“ERISA was passed by Congress in 1974 
to safeguard employees from the abuse and mismanagement of funds that had been accumulated to 
finance various types of employee benefits.”); John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”: 
The Supreme Court’s Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1317, 
1365–66 (2003) (“Congress federalized the law of pension and benefit plan administration for the 
primary purpose of protecting plan participants and beneficiaries through a triple regime of 
mandatory trusteeship, extensive fiduciary duties, and commensurate remedies.”). 
 4. See Dana M. Muir, Fiduciary Status as an Employer’s Shield: The Perversity of ERISA 
Fiduciary Law, 2 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 391, 392 (2000) (“Only in the realm of private sector 
employee benefit plans . . . have fiduciaries been able to turn their status as fiduciaries, a status that 
once required ‘the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive,’ into a shield against liability.” (footnote 
omitted) (quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928))); see also Colleen E. Medill, 
Resolving the Judicial Paradox of “Equitable” Relief Under ERISA Section 502(a)(3), 39 J. Marshall 
L. Rev. 827, 829–30 (2006) (“Plan participants who enter this labyrinth find that, contrary to their 
expectations, federal law does not protect their rights concerning plan benefits.”). 
 5. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985) (quoting Nachman Corp. v. 
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980)). 
 6. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (emphasis added); see also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52 
(1987) (“The civil enforcement scheme of § 502(a) is one of the essential tools for accomplishing the 
stated purposes of ERISA.”). 
 7. See supra note 3. 
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instead emphasized a subsidiary policy of containing employee benefits 
plan costs.8 In doing so, the Court’s ostensible goal is to ensure that 
employers continue to voluntarily adopt ERISA plans.9 Yet, this 
restrictive approach is contrary to the remedial nature of the legislation, 
and the elevation of this secondary purpose consistently favors employer 
interests. 
Unlike some ERISA commentators,10 I believe that the legislative 
history of ERISA clearly rejects the idea that these “right without 
remedy” cases arise because of a compromise entered into by employer 
and employee group advocates at the time of ERISA’s enactment. 
Although ERISA’s broad preemptive reach was calculated and 
intentional,11 there is no similar evidence that Congress meant there to be 
a limited remedial scheme for protecting employee benefits. Nothing in 
the legislative record, the views of the so-called literalist Justices to the 
contrary notwithstanding,12 evinces Congress’s intent to say all that it 
intended to say on particular remedies.13 Instead, it is the Supreme Court 
that has blundered in its incorporation of inappropriate trust law 
analogies in this area of the law.14 In short, intersectionality is a problem 
 
 8. See Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 515 (1981) (noting that ERISA’s 
primary goal was to benefit employees and that a secondary goal was to contain costs). 
 9. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262–63 (1993); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. 
McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990); see also Susan J. Stabile, Freedom to Choose Unwisely: 
Congress’ Misguided Decision to Leave 401(k) Participants to Their Own Devices, 11 Cornell J.L. & 
Pub. Pol’y 361, 400 (2002) (“Any suggestion for pension reform must be assessed in light of the reality 
that pension plan sponsorship is voluntary. ERISA imposes significant substantive regulation on 
pension plans, but leaves the decision whether to offer a pension plan in the first place to 
employers.”). 
 10. See, e.g., More on that Grand Irony Theory, http://www.bostonerisalaw.com/archives/benefit-
litigation-more-on-that-grand-irony-theory.html (Dec. 3, 2007) (“ERISA simply leaves some harms 
incapable of remediation, something that is understood to have simply been part of the balancing act 
engaged in by Congress in enacting the statute, in which a decision was made to grant only limited 
rights of recovery in exchange for enacting a statute that would encourage the creation of employee 
benefits.”). 
 11. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1987) (“We have observed in the past 
that the express pre-emption provisions of ERISA are deliberately expansive . . . .”); see also Stephen 
F. Befort & Christopher J. Kopka, The Sounds of Silence: The Libertarian Ethos of ERISA 
Preemption, 52 Fla. L. Rev. 1, 3–4 (2000) (“A review of ERISA’s legislative history and post-
enactment amendments suggests that this Congressional silence was intentional and, more 
importantly, consistent in purpose with the broad scope of preemption announced by the Court nearly 
two decades ago.”). 
 12. See infra Part III.A. 
 13. See S. Rep. No. 93-127, at 35 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4871 (describing 
Senate version of enforcement provisions as intended to “provide both the Secretary and participants 
and beneficiaries with broad remedies for redressing or preventing violations of [ERISA]”); H.R. Rep. 
No. 93-533, at 17 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4655 (describing House version in 
identical terms). 
 14. See Langbein, supra note 3, at 1319 (“When federalizing the administration of pension and 
employee benefit plans in ERISA, Congress made a deliberate choice to subject these plans to the 
pre-existing regime of trust law rather than to invent a new regulatory structure.”); see also Susan 
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under the current scheme not because of a broad preemption scheme 
alone, but because of the impact of this broad preemption coupled with a 
limited ERISA remedial scheme. 
To cure what currently ails ERISA, this Article proposes three legal 
reforms—one judicial and two legislative. The judicial approach would 
call for the Court to adopt a remedialist approach, which would be in line 
both with Congress’s intent to incorporate most of the common law of 
trusts into ERISA,15 and also consistent with a modern interpretation of 
a remedial statute. Only to the extent that there were intended to be 
deviations from that common law should the unique characteristics of the 
ERISA statute be considered in applying the remedial provisions.16 
Congress should also take steps to expand the remedies available 
under ERISA. To effect this recalibration, Congress should reexamine 
and reject the far-fetched analogy between ERISA, enacted in 1974, and 
“the days of the divided bench”17 analysis offered up by Justice Scalia in 
Mertens v. Hewitt Associates.18 Congress should overrule Mertens by 
providing an express and expansive definition for “appropriate equitable 
relief” under my proposal for a new section 3(43). Additionally, 
Congress could pass an ERISA Civil Rights Act under my proposal for a 
new section 502(a)(11), which, like the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in the 
Title VII context,19 would permit capped, compensatory, and punitive 
damage awards in appropriate cases. 
This Article is divided into four Parts. The first Part briefly provides 
an overview of the present state of ERISA law in the preemption and 
remedial areas. In the second Part, the Article discusses the 
 
Harthill, A Square Peg in a Round Hole: Whether Traditional Trust Law “Make-Whole” Relief Is 
Available Under ERISA Section 502(a)(3), 61 Okla. L. Rev. 721, 723 (2008) (deconstructing 
traditional trust law to determine whether make-whole relief was typically available for breaches of 
fiduciary duty and concluding that such relief was available, although it is an ill-fitting form of relief 
for modern ERISA employee welfare benefits plans). 
 15. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496 (1996) (“[W]e recognize that these fiduciary duties 
draw much of their content from the common law of trusts, the law that governed most benefit plans 
before ERISA’s enactment.”); see also Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp., 
Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570 (1985) (“[R]ather than explicitly enumerating all of the powers and duties of 
trustees and other fiduciaries, Congress invoked the common law of trusts to define the general scope 
of their authority and responsibility.”). 
 16. Varity, 516 U.S. at 497 (“[W]e believe that the law of trusts often will inform, but will not 
necessarily determine the outcome of, an effort to interpret ERISA’s fiduciary duties. In some 
instances, trust law will offer only a starting point, after which courts must go on to ask whether, or to 
what extent, the language of the statute, its structure, or its purposes require departing from common-
law trust requirements.”). 
 17. Great-W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 212 (2002). 
 18.  508 U.S. 248, 256–57 (1993); Langbein, supra note 3, at 1361 (“It was Justice Scalia, or rather, 
the five-member Supreme Court majority assembled for his opinions, and not Congress, which gave 
the term [appropriate equitable relief] the unnatural and dysfunctional meaning propounded in 
Mertens and Great-West.”). 
 19. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2006). 
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intersectionality problem and provides illustrations of cases that 
demonstrate the nature of this problem. The third Part first examines the 
debate between the literalist and remedialist Justices on the Court over 
the years and then offers a judicial fix to this intersectionality problem by 
applying the rationale of remedialist Justices to these intersectionality 
cases. To the extent that the judicial recalibration does not lead to an 
adequately remedial statute, the fourth Part suggests that Congress 
define more broadly “appropriate equitable relief” in proposed 
section 3(43), or take more dramatic steps and enact an ERISA Civil 
Rights Act under section 502(a)(11), modeled on the Civil Rights Act of 
1991. 
I.  Brief Overview of the Remedial and 
Preemption Provisions of ERISA 
ERISA is a complex statute covering an extensive area of law. It 
“protects employee pensions and other benefits by providing 
insurance . . . , specifying certain plan characteristics in detail . . . , and by 
setting forth certain general fiduciary duties applicable to the 
management of both pension and nonpension benefits plans.”20 Although 
employers are not required to offer employee benefits plans,21 once such 
plans are adopted, ERISA provides the applicable legal framework. 
This Part of the Article examines the roots of the intersectionality 
problem that I identify at the junction of the remedial and preemption 
provisions of the Act. The first section explores the intentionally-broad 
preemption provisions of section 514 of the Act. The second section then 
considers the restrictive interpretation given to ERISA’s remedial 
provisions under section 502(a). 
A. ERISA’s Broad Preemption Scheme 
Section 514 of ERISA is a broadly-written preemption provision 
that permits ERISA to supersede any state law that “relate[s] to” 
employee benefits plans.22 A state law may nevertheless be saved from 
ERISA preemption if it regulates insurance, securities, or banking under 
“the savings clause.”23 However, even if the state law regulates insurance, 
 
 20. Varity, 516 U.S. at 496. 
 21. See Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 887 (1996) (“Nothing in ERISA requires 
employers to establish employee benefits plans.”). 
 22. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006). State laws are defined expansively to include “all laws, decisions, 
rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of law, of any State.” Id. § 1144(c)(1). If the 
law in question relating to an employee benefits plan is either a state criminal law or another federal 
law, ERISA preemption does not apply. Id. § 1144(b)(4), (d).  
 23.  Id. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (“[N]othing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve 
any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities.”). 
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it may still be preempted under section 514(b)(2)(B), known as the 
“deemer clause,” if the state law is being applied to a self-insured plan.24 
Because the “relate to” language of section 514 potentially has no 
meaningful limit,25 the Supreme Court has struggled to bring some 
coherence to this provision.26 The Court’s attempts can be broadly 
broken down into the early preemption cases and the modern 
preemption cases. In the end, however, ERISA preemption largely 
maintains its expansive characteristics, consistent with the aims of its 
legislative drafters. 
1. The “Relates to” Analysis Under Section 514(a) 
a. The Early Preemption Cases 
 The early preemption cases applied a broad, field preemption 
approach under which ERISA was thought to completely occupy the 
field of employee benefits law. For instance, in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 
Inc., three employers provided ERISA-covered medical plans to their 
employees.27 These plans failed to provide benefits to pregnant 
employees as mandated by New York state laws.28 In deciding whether 
the New York laws were preempted by ERISA, the Court interpreted 
the “relates to” language in section 514(a) to mean that a state law is 
preempted if it makes “reference to” or has a “connection with” an 
ERISA plan.29 The Court concluded that the New York laws requiring 
pregnancy coverage had a connection with employee benefits laws 
because the New York laws mandated what the plans had to cover.30 In 
coming to this conclusion, the Court noted that “[t]he breadth of 
§ 514(a)’s pre-emptive reach is apparent from that section’s language.”31 
The Court also delved into ERISA’s legislative history and pointed out 
that “[t]he bill that became ERISA originally contained a limited pre-
emption clause, applicable only to state laws relating to the specific 
subjects covered by ERISA. The Conference Committee rejected these 
 
 24. Id. § 514(b)(2)(B). 
 25. See N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 
656 (1995) (“If ‘relate to’ were taken to extend to the furthest stretch of its indeterminacy, then for all 
practical purposes pre-emption would never run its course, for ‘[r]eally, universally, relations stop 
nowhere.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Henry James, Roderick Hudson, at xli (N.Y. ed., World’s 
Classics 1980))). 
 26. See DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 808 (1997) (“This is 
another Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) pre-emption case.”); Pilot Life 
v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987) (noting the “statutory complexity of ERISA’s three pre-emption 
provisions”). 
 27. 463 U.S. 85, 92 (1983).  
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 96–97. 
 30. Id. at 97. 
 31. Id. at 96. 
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provisions in favor of the present language, and indicated that the 
section’s pre-emptive scope was as broad as its language.”32 
Cases subsequent to Shaw continued to emphasize the expansive 
scope of ERISA preemption. In Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 
Dedeaux injured his back while working for his employer.33 He was 
covered under a long-term disability insurance plan covered by ERISA, 
and although he initially received coverage for his back ailment, the 
benefits were terminated by Pilot Life after two years.34 Thereafter, 
Dedeaux’s benefits were reinstated a number of times, and Dedeaux 
sought to bring a number of common-law, bad faith insurance claims 
under Mississippi state tort and contract law.35 The Court held, however, 
that state tort and contracts claims alleging improper processing of a 
benefits claim were preempted by ERISA because the state law claims 
clearly related to the administration of an ERISA plan.36 
In another early case, Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, the Court 
examined the “reference to” aspect of the Shaw test.37 In that case, an 
employer terminated an employee in “a companywide reduction in 
force.”38 The employee claimed that the true reason for terminating him 
was so that he could not vest in his pension.39 Rather than suing under 
section 510 of ERISA, which provides a remedy for interference with 
ERISA rights,40 the employee sued under the Texas common law of 
contract and tort.41 The Court concluded that the state wrongful-
discharge action was preempted.42 In particular, the Court found the 
state-law claim preempted because it made “reference to” an ERISA 
plan and since the existence of, and participation in, the plan was an 
essential element of the Texas state law action.43 
In all, the early preemption cases are characterized by a very broad 
field preemption approach.44 Consequently, most state constitutional, 
 
 32. Id. at 98 (footnote omitted) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 93-1280, at 383 (1974) (Conf. Rep.), 
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5162; S. Rep. No. 93-1090, at 383 (1974) (Conf. Rep.)). 
 33. 481 U.S. 41, 43 (1987).  
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 43–44. 
 36. Id. at 48 (“The common law causes of action raised in Dedeaux’s complaint, each based on 
alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits under an employee benefit plan, undoubtedly meet 
the criteria for pre-emption under § 514(a).”). 
 37. 498 U.S. 133, 139 (1990). 
 38. Id. at 135. 
 39. Id. at 135–36. 
 40.  29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006). 
 41. Ingersoll, 498 U.S. at 136. 
 42. Id. at 140. 
 43. Id. The later Supreme Court case of California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v. 
Dillingham Construction, 519 U.S. 316, 325 (1997), makes clear that the “reference to” preemption test 
may also be satisfied by establishing that the state law purports to regulate ERISA plans exclusively.  
 44. See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 98 (1983). 
 November 2009] THE GRAND IRONY OF ERISA 139 
statutory, and common law claims that in any way related to employee 
benefits were superseded and plaintiffs would have to find whatever 
remedy they had under ERISA. 
b. Modern Preemption Cases 
At first blush, modern preemption cases appeared to abandon the 
broader field preemption approach in favor of a more narrow conflict 
preemption approach.45 Under this new doctrine, a state cause of action 
is preempted only to the extent that it is impossible to comply with both 
ERISA and the state law or where the state law interferes with the 
purposes and objectives of ERISA.46 
The seminal case that introduces this paradigm shift in ERISA 
preemption law is New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.47 In Travelers, New York’s 
Prospective Hospital Reimbursement Methodology statute regulated in-
patient hospital rates in New York.48 Different diagnostic-related groups 
(DRGs) were established and set up the average cost of these services.49 
The catch was that a preference existed for patients with Blue Cross/Blue 
Shield insurance, Medicaid, and HMOs.50 Such patients were billed for 
hospital services at the lower DRG rate, while others were charged at the 
DRG rate plus a twenty-four percent surcharge.51 Several nonpreferred 
insurers brought a claim to have the New York statute declared invalid 
on the basis of ERISA preemption.52 
Travelers starts by changing the starting point of the ERISA 
preemption analysis: 
[W]e have never assumed lightly that Congress has derogated state 
regulation, but instead have addressed claims of pre-emption with the 
starting presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state 
law. Indeed, in cases like this one, where federal law is said to bar state 
action in fields of traditional state regulation, we have worked on the 
“assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be 
 
 45. See generally DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 808–09 
(1997) (finding that a state statute imposing a tax on ERISA-funded medical centers was not 
preempted); Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 319 (finding that prevailing wage laws for apprentices did not 
relate to ERISA plans); N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 
U.S. 645, 661 (1995) (finding that state regulation of health care costs did not relate to employee 
benefits plans within the meaning of ERISA section 514). 
 46. See Larry J. Pittman, A Plain Meaning Interpretation of ERISA’s Preemption and Saving 
Clauses: In Support of a State Law Preemption of Section 1132(a) of ERISA’s Civil Enforcement 
Provisions, 41 San Diego L. Rev. 593, 598 (2004). 
 47. 514 U.S. 645 (1995). 
 48. Id. at 649. 
 49. Id. at 649–50. 
 50. Id. at 650. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 651–52. 
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superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest 
purpose of Congress.”53 
In other words, Travelers represents a paradigm shift from field 
preemption to conflict preemption which potentially could leave a wider 
swath of state laws untouched by ERISA. It purports to create a 
rebuttable presumption against ERISA preemption if traditional areas of 
state law are involved.54 
To determine whether preemption applies, the Travelers Court 
directs that essentially two questions be addressed: (1) whether there are 
compelling policy reasons under ERISA to preempt state law; and (2) if 
so, does the state law undermine these policy objectives?55 According to 
the Court, such compelling policy reasons are undermined by state law in 
instances where the law mandates the type of benefits a plan must 
provide56 and where the law interferes too much with a secondary policy 
of ERISA:57 nationally uniform administration of employee benefits 
plans.58 On the other hand, the New York state law in Travelers was not 
preempted because it only had an indirect economic influence on the 
pricing of insurance policies.59 Such an impact might influence the 
decisions of plan sponsors in selecting a health insurer, but not to the 
necessary degree to interfere with the national policy of benefits 
uniformity.60 
Although the new language under Travelers suggests that the scope 
of ERISA preemption should not have been as expansive in the modern 
era as it was in the early preemption cases, many state laws in the 
intervening years have not survived ERISA preemption.61 At first, it 
 
 53. Id. at 654–55 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
 54. Id. 
 55. See id. at 658–63. 
 56. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 727–28 (1985). 
 57. Because this policy is only in legislative history and court cases, I refer to it as a “secondary 
policy,” as opposed to the primary purpose in ERISA of protecting employee benefits. 
 58. See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 657. “The basic thrust of the pre-emption clause, then, was to avoid 
a multiplicity of regulation in order to permit the nationally uniform administration of employee 
benefit plans.” Id. The Court over the years has found that several types of state laws interfere too 
much with the policy of national uniformity and, therefore, relate to an employee benefits plan. See, 
e.g., Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141 (2001) (state law regulating plan participant’s beneficiary 
designation); UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999) (state law making employer 
agent of insurance company). On the other hand, there are state laws that only indirectly interfere 
with these same ERISA policy objectives, and are not preempted. See, e.g., Travelers, 514 U.S. 645 
(state law imposing surcharge on health care plan insurer or plan assets); Cal. Div. of Labor Stds. 
Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., 519 U.S. 316 (1997) (state law regulating wages paid to 
apprentices at public construction work projects); DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. 
Fund, 520 U.S. 806 (1997) (state law imposing a tax on hospitals, most of which do not operate ERISA 
plans). 
 59. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 668. 
 60. Id. at 662. 
 61. See infra notes 68–84 and accompanying text. 
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appeared that the Court would follow fairly closely its new approach to 
preemption. For instance, in DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Medical & Clinical 
Services Fund, a mere two years after Travelers, the Court examined a 
New York state law which imposed a direct tax on a plan asset (a 
hospital that provided services for participants and their beneficiaries).62 
Finding that the state law was “a tax on hospitals,” and that, “[m]ost 
hospitals are not owned or operated by ERISA funds, the Court found 
the law not preempted because it did not interfere too much with the 
underlying policy of ERISA.63 One can argue about whether this law had 
a direct impact on plan administration, but the Court apparently decided 
that certain laws designed to subsidize health care financing are more in 
an area of traditional state concern.64 
Similarly, in California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v. 
Dillingham Construction,65 involving the application of a state living-
wage ordinance to apprentices on public construction work projects, the 
Court limited the “reference to” prong of the Shaw preemption test to a 
narrower one: the question now is whether the state law is in reference 
exclusively to an ERISA plan.66 In other words, does the state law 
exclusively regulate ERISA plans or does it also regulate non-ERISA 
plans? If the latter, then the state law does not make “reference to” 
ERISA for purposes of preemption.67 Thus, Dillingham represents yet 
another step back from the field preemption approach and a narrowing 
of ERISA preemption. 
Yet, a more recent case might suggest a trend back to an expansive 
interpretation of ERISA’s preemption clause. The family law case of 
Egelhoff v. Egelhoff68 is a case in point. David Egelhoff initially 
designated his second wife, Donna Rae, as the beneficiary of his life 
insurance policy and pension plan.69 They later divorced, and before he 
could change the beneficiary designation, he died in a car accident.70 His 
children from his first marriage claimed they were owed the proceeds of 
the policy.71 They argued that a Washington state statute made the 
designation of the proceeds to Donna Rae void because the state law 
assumed that David would not want to assign his benefits to his 
 
 62. 520 U.S. 806, 810 (1997).  
 63. Id. at 816. 
 64. See id. 
 65. 519 U.S. 316 (1997). 
 66. Id. at 324–25. Because that was not the case in Dillingham, the state law survived. Id. at 319. 
 67. Id.  
 68. 532 U.S. 141 (2001). 
 69. Id. at 144. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
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estranged wife.72 Donna Rae argued that the state law was preempted 
and ERISA permitted her to keep the funds as the named beneficiary.73 
The Supreme Court ruled that the Washington law was preempted 
even though family law is an area of traditional state concern.74 The 
majority found that the law interfered too much with “the payment of 
benefits, a central matter of plan administration,”75 and the uniformity of 
plan administration for the company,76 and noted that the Court has “not 
hesitated to find state family law pre-empted when it conflicts with 
ERISA or relates to ERISA plans.”77 Moreover, the Court reasoned, the 
lack of uniformity in plan administration would discourage employers 
from voluntarily setting up pension plans and life insurance policies, 
which would be contrary to a core policy concern of ERISA.78 
Egelhoff thus represents a shift back to a broader preemption 
scheme based on plan cost and uniform-administration concerns. Other 
preemption cases from around the same time as Egelhoff similarly have 
applied an expansive concept of preemption to find state laws to be 
preempted.79 
An even more recent example of the continuing expansive quality of 
ERISA preemption comes from a much ballyhooed appellate case 
involving Wal-Mart and the provision of health care to its workers.80 
Maryland passed “Fair Share Health Care” legislation,81 which would 
have required Wal-Mart to spend eight percent of its payroll on health 
insurance costs for its employees.82 In Retail Industry Leaders Ass’n v. 
Fielder, a trade association representing Wal-Mart challenged the 
 
 72. Id. at 144–45. 
 73. Id. at 146. 
 74. Id. at 151. 
 75. Id. at 148. 
 76. Id. at 148–49. 
 77. Id. at 151. 
 78. Id. at 149–50 (“Requiring ERISA administrators to master the relevant laws of 50 States and 
to contend with litigation would undermine the congressional goal of ‘minimiz[ing] the administrative 
and financial burden[s]’ on plan administrators—burdens ultimately borne by the beneficiaries.” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990))). 
However, it is not even clear that an increase in plan administration costs actually causes fewer 
adoptions of employee benefits plans. Since most benefits are outsourced to major insurers or 
financial companies, which then spread the costs across numerous plans, is there really a cost impact at 
all on the typical employer, as the Court suggests? Thanks to Stephen Rosenberg of the McCormack 
Firm, LLC, for his insights on this topic. 
 79. See, e.g., UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 364 (1999) (finding state law 
making employer agent of insurance company preempted). 
 80. See Stephanie Armour, Maryland First to OK ‘Wal-Mart bill’, USA Today, Jan. 12, 2006, 
http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/retail/2006-01-12-walmart-maryland_x.htm. 
 81. Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. §§ 8.5-101 to -107 (LexisNexis 2008). 
 82. The bill applies to all employers with over 10,000 Maryland employees, but the other three 
employers in Maryland who fell into that category had already spent at least eight percent of payroll 
on health insurance costs. See Armour, supra note 80. 
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Maryland law on ERISA preemption grounds.83 The Fourth Circuit held 
that the Fair Share law interfered too much with the uniform 
administration of Wal-Mart’s health plan and, therefore, was preempted 
as having a “connection with” an ERISA plan.84 
In the last year, however, new signs indicate that the scope of 
ERISA preemption may again be narrowing. A similar Fair Share law 
was enacted in San Francisco requiring medium and large employers in 
the city to make minimum health care expenditures on behalf of covered 
employees, either by paying into their own employee benefits plans or 
into a fund maintained and administered by the city.85 In Golden Gate 
Restaurant Ass’n v. City and County of San Francisco, the Golden Gate 
Restaurant Association challenged this law on behalf of its membership 
on ERISA preemption grounds.86 The Ninth Circuit ruled that the San 
Francisco health-care law was not preempted by ERISA because such 
preemption is restricted in state-law areas that historically involve 
matters “of local concern”87 like the provision of health care and the San 
Francisco ordinance “offer[ed] employers a meaningful alternative that 
allow[ed] them to preserve the existing structure of their ERISA plans.”88 
Golden Gate thus again narrows the scope of ERISA preemption.89 
Yet, the Ninth Circuit’s decision appears to be an outlier at this point and 
it may still be overturned on appeal. It is more likely that the Supreme 
Court and lower federal courts will continue to find many state-law 
claims preempted under an expansive notion of the “relates to” language 
of section 514 based on concerns of cost and national uniformity in the 
administration of employee benefits plans. 
2. Further Broadening of ERISA Preemption: The Impact of the 
Savings and Deemer Clauses 
The “relate to” language of section 514(a) is not the end of the 
preemption analysis. The savings clause generally still keeps state laws 
regulating insurance, banking, and securities free from ERISA 
 
 83. 475 F.3d 180, 197 (4th Cir. 2007).  
 84. Id. at 183. The reader may recall that in finding that the Maryland law had a “connection 
with” employee benefits plans, the court was really indicating that the state law was preempted 
because it was “related to” an ERISA-governed employee benefits plan. See id. at 192. 
 85. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Golden Gate Restaurant Association: Employer Mandates and 
ERISA Preemption in the Ninth Circuit, 47 State Tax Notes 603, 603 (2008).  
 86. 546 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2008), petition for cert. filed, 77 U.S.L.W. 3691 (U.S. June 5, 2009) 
(No. 08–1515). 
 87. Id. at 647 (quoting N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 
514 U.S. 645, 661 (1995)). 
 88. Id. at 660. 
 89. Id. at 654 (“We read Travelers as narrowing the Court’s interpretation of the scope of 
§ 514(a).”). 
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preemption.90 At the same time, the deemer clause provides a route back 
into preemption for self-insured health plans.91 
With regard to the savings clause, consider its narrow operation in 
Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux.92 Recall that the Mississippi 
common law contract and tort claims for benefits were found to be 
“related to” ERISA.93 However, of equal importance, the Court gave a 
restrictive gloss to the meaning of a “state law regulating insurance”94 
under the savings clause.95 Here, the Court held that the plaintiff’s claim 
had its “roots” grounded in state tort and contract law, and thus did not 
qualify as a law regulating insurance, which would have been saved from 
preemption.96 So although the savings clause is set up to diminish the 
scope of ERISA preemption, it has been interpreted in a way that leads 
to many state common law claims being preempted.97 
On the other hand, the deemer clause is broadly construed to keep 
more claims within ERISA preemption. For instance, in FMC Corp. v. 
Holliday, the question presented was whether a self-funded health 
benefits plan was subject to a Pennsylvania antisubrogation law.98 The 
preemption analysis concluded that the Pennsylvania law was preempted 
because it was “relate[d] to” an employee benefits plan99 and also 
determined that the law was subsequently saved as a law that regulated 
insurance.100 However, applying the deemer clause, the self-insured 
employer was not deemed to be an insurance company for purposes of 
the Pennsylvania antisubrogation law.101 The upshot is that FMC Corp. 
and other self-insured employers are exempted from state laws that 
 
 90. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2006).  
 91. Id. § 1144(b)(2)(B). 
 92. 481 U.S. 41 (1987). 
 93. See supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text. 
 94. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).  
 95. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 50. 
 96. Id. 
 97. It is still unclear whether the recent modification of the test for determining which state laws 
regulate insurance under Kentucky Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2002), will 
change the result of cases like Pilot Life. See E. Farish Percy, Applying the Common Fund Doctrine to 
an ERISA-Governed Employee Benefit Plan’s Claim for Subrogation or Reimbursement, 61 Fla. L. 
Rev. 55, 60–61 (2009) (“Even though the Miller test broadened the scope of the savings clause, at least 
one lower court has recently applied the test in a manner inconsistent with congressional intent to save 
state laws regulating insurance from preemption.” (footnote omitted) (referencing Levine v. United 
Healthcare Corp., 402 F.3d 156 (3d Cir. 2005))). 
 98. 498 U.S. 52, 54 (1990). A subrogation clause requires a plan participant to reimburse the plan 
for any benefits paid if the participant also recovers on a claim in a tort action against a third party. Id. 
Pennsylvania had a law, the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1720 
(1987), which prohibited plans from enforcing such subrogation provisions. 498 U.S. at 55. 
 99. 498 U.S. at 58. 
 100. Id. at 60–61. 
 101. Id. at 61 (“We read the deemer clause to exempt self-funded ERISA plans from state laws 
that ‘regulat[e] insurance’ within the meaning of the saving clause.” (alteration in original)). 
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regulate insurance.102 Not surprisingly, because of this dichotomy 
between insured and self-insured health plans, a tremendous shift has 
occurred in the United States in that many employers are setting up self-
funded health plans to avoid state insurance regulation and more state-
law actions are consequently being preempted under ERISA.103 
In short, the operation of the savings and deemer clauses, as 
interpreted by the Supreme Court, has contributed to maintaining the 
broad scope of ERISA preemption. 
B. ERISA’s Limited Remedial Provisions 
Separate and apart from the mostly expansive readings given to 
ERISA preemption provisions is the constricted interpretation given to 
the remedial provisions under section 502(a). This narrow reading stems 
from one of the first remedies cases, Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance 
Co. v. Russell.104 Although the Court in Russell was unanimous on the 
specific question before it—deciding there were no compensatory or 
punitive damages under the breach of fiduciary provisions of section 
502(a)(2)105—more importantly the Justices divided into camps regarding 
the proper way to interpret the structure of section 502(a). 
The majority in Russell advocated a literalist approach to statutory 
construction that narrowly read the remedies available under ERISA.106 
In this regard, the five-Justice majority wrote: 
  The six carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions found in 
§ 502(a) of the statute as finally enacted . . . provide strong evidence 
that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply 
forgot to incorporate expressly. The assumption of inadvertent 
omission is rendered especially suspect upon close consideration of 
ERISA’s interlocking, interrelated, and interdependent remedial 
scheme, which is in turn part of a “comprehensive and reticulated 
statute.” . . .  
  We are reluctant to tamper with an enforcement scheme crafted 
with such evident care as the one in ERISA.107 
 
 102. See id. 
 103. See Colleen Medill, Introduction to Employee Benefits Law: Policy and Practice 307 
(2d ed. 2007) (“In 2006, 55% of workers with employer-sponsored health care coverage were enrolled 
in a health care plan that was completely or partially self-insured by the employer.”). 
 104. 473 U.S. 134 (1985); see also Muir, supra note 4, at 434 (“As the first Supreme Court 
precedent in the area, the opinion set the tone for ERISA remedial jurisprudence, particularly with 
regard to the scope of available remedies.”). As will be argued in Part III.A, infra, what makes Russell 
pivotal is that it creates an ideological divide between literalist and remedialist Justices that has now 
lasted for almost twenty-five years. 
 105. 473 U.S. at 148. 
 106. 473 U.S. at 146–47. 
 107. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 466 U.S. 
359, 361 (1980)).  
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On the other hand, the four remedialist Justices in Russell believed 
that trust law should be the starting point for the interpretation of these 
remedial provisions.108 In particular, they argue that because of the 
primacy of trust law in ERISA, 
in resolving this and other questions concerning appropriate relief 
under ERISA, courts should begin by ascertaining the extent to which 
trust and pension law as developed by state and federal courts provide 
for recovery by the beneficiary above and beyond the benefits that 
have been withheld; this is the logical first step, given that Congress 
intended to incorporate trust law into ERISA’s equitable remedies.109 
Applying this logic to Russell, because compensatory and punitive 
damages were not available as equitable remedies under trust law, the 
remedialist Justices had no problem agreeing that these remedies were 
not available under section 502(a)(2).110 That being said, they viewed 
ERISA primarily as a remedial statute and believed it should be 
interpreted broadly to meet its stated purpose of protecting employee 
benefits.111 
These statutory construction arguments pervade the analysis of the 
three major types of civil enforcement provisions of ERISA:112 section 
502(a)(1)(B) claims are instituted to recover benefits, to enforce rights 
under the plan, or to clarify rights to future benefits.113 Section 502(a)(2), 
read together with section 409, provides for breach of fiduciary duty 
claims and permits personal liability against individual fiduciaries to 
make the plan whole.114 Finally, section 502(a)(3) enjoins any act or 
practice which violates ERISA, but is limited to claims for “appropriate 
equitable relief.”115 This section examines each of these remedial sections 
seriatim. 
1. Claims for Benefits Under Section 502(a)(1)(B) 
Section 502(a)(1)(B) claims are brought by a plan participant or 
beneficiary against the plan for the value of denied benefits or rights.116 
For instance, if a plan participant wishes to receive a particular heart 
procedure under his or her health plan and the plan administrator denies 
the claim, the participant may file a claim against the plan for recovery of 
 
 108. See infra notes 109–11.  
 109. Russell, 473 U.S. at 157 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (footnote omitted). 
 110. See id. at 150. 
 111. See id. at 155–56. 
 112. There are other civil actions under section 502(a), including a claim under section 
502(a)(1)(A) for refusal to supply requested plan information, but this discussion focuses on the three 
most frequently utilized civil enforcement sections. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2006). ERISA also 
provides for potential criminal penalties for willful violations of the Act. See id. § 1131. 
 113. Id. § 1132(a)(1)(B). 
 114. Id. §§ 1132(a)(2), 1109.  
 115. Id. § 1132(a)(3)(B). 
 116. Id. § 1132(a)(1)(B). 
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the value of that heart procedure. However, other forms of consequential 
relief, including compensatory and punitive damages, do not appear to 
be available under section 502(a)(1)(B).117 The lack of monetary relief is 
a dispositive reason why many employer-defendants would rather try 
these claims under ERISA, rather than under a state law wrongful death 
claim or other tort. 
Furthermore, section 502(a)(1)(B) contains a tricky procedural 
landscape for ERISA plaintiffs to manage. First, it is the only remedial 
provision that currently requires exhaustion of internal remedies.118 
Consequently, by the time these claims make it to federal court, the 
procedural posture is that of a review of a denial of benefits claim by the 
plan administrator. Second, and making matters worse for ERISA 
plaintiffs, is the fact that the standard of judicial review is highly 
deferential under Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch.119 Although the 
Court determined that the default review standard was de novo, as long 
as the company places the authority to decide benefits determinations 
within the plan administrator’s discretion, the resulting benefits 
determinations will be upheld as long as they are not arbitrary or 
capricious.120 Indeed, even if the plan administrator is the entity that both 
pays benefits and determines eligibility for benefits, Metlife v. Glenn 
stands for the proposition that the subsequent conflict is just one factor 
to be considered, under the totality of circumstances, by a court in 
deciding whether the benefits determination should be upheld under the 
arbitrary or capricious standard.121 In all, it will probably surprise no one 
to learn that plaintiffs win very few benefits claims in federal or state 
court under section 502(a)(1)(B),122 and even when they do, the remedy 
 
 117. See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 144 (1985) (“[Section 502(a)(1)(B)] says 
nothing about the recovery of extracontractual damages, or about the possible consequences of delay 
in the plan administrators’ processing of a disputed claim.”). 
 118. Exhaustion is mandated by section 503 and the regulations thereunder. See 29 U.S.C. § 1133; 
29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (2009). This means that once a claim has been denied by a plan administrator, 
the plan participant must file an appeal with the administrator and wait for a further adverse 
determination before bringing his or her benefits claim in state or federal court. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-
1. Section 503 regulations set up various time limits by which a claim appeal must be filed and decided. 
Id. 
 119. 489 U.S. 101, 111 (1989). 
 120. Id. at 114–15. 
 121. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343, 2346 (2008) (“Often the entity that administers 
the plan, such as an employer or an insurance company, both determines whether an employee is 
eligible for benefits and pays benefits out of its own pockets. We here decide that this dual role creates 
a conflict of interest; that a reviewing court should consider that conflict as a factor in determining 
whether the plan administrator has abused its discretion in denying benefits; and that the significance 
of the factor will depend upon the circumstances of the particular case.”). 
 122. One frequent litigator of section 502(a)(1)(B) claims responded to my inquiry on a listserv 
about the success of these claims by stating that he almost never wins these cases if the abuse of 
discretion standard applies. Posting of Mark DeBofsky, mdebofsky@ddbchicago.com, to 
BENEFITSPROF-L@lists.ou.edu (Feb. 6, 2009) (on file with the Hastings Law Journal). Even if he 
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available is often inadequate in relation to the harm suffered because of 
the lack of consequential damages.123 
Thus, both the nature of the remedy under this section and the 
standard of court review in these cases represent significant obstacles for 
employees in receiving adequate relief for denial of benefits under 
ERISA. 
2. Claims For Fiduciary Breaches Under Section 502(a)(2) 
If anything, the situation for ERISA plaintiffs might be worse under 
section 502(a)(2) breach of fiduciary provisions, though there is reason 
for hope for plaintiffs in the 401(k) pension plan context. Section 
502(a)(2) directly incorporates section 409, which provides that 
breaching fiduciaries are personally liable to only the plan to make good 
for any losses, not to individual plan participants or beneficiaries.124 As 
recounted above, this led the Supreme Court in Massachusetts Mutual 
Life Insurance Co. v. Russell to unanimously determine that plaintiffs 
may not recover compensatory or punitive damages under this section.125 
Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court recently found in LaRue v. 
DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, Inc., that an individual 401(k) account 
holder could bring a section 502(a)(2) claim against the plan for losses 
caused to that account by the plan’s conduct.126 Thus, individual 
participants in 401(k) plans may be able to receive relief for wrongful 
conduct undertaken by a plan administrator with regard to their 
accounts. However, and as will be discussed below,127 the concurring 
opinion of Chief Justice Roberts in LaRue, which argues that the claim is 
one for benefits under 502(a)(1)(B) and requires internal exhaustion like 
benefits claims,128 might prove problematic for ERISA plaintiffs going 
forward. 
3. Claims for Equitable Relief Under Section 502(a)(3) 
Because there is little individual relief available under the fiduciary 
provisions of section 502(a)(2), a plaintiff seeking to recover on an 
individual basis for a breach of fiduciary duty must look to section 
502(a)(3). Yet section 502(a)(3), as interpreted by the Supreme Court, is 
limited in important respects as a remedy for plaintiffs. First of all, the 
 
does win, the court usually “remands” to the plan administrator so the plan administrator can come up 
with new reasons to deny benefits, and, as a result, he ends up settling these cases (but only by taking a 
huge discount on the value of these claims). Id.  
 123. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 124. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(2), 1109 (2006).  
 125. 473 U.S. 134, 138 (1985).  
 126. 128 S. Ct. 1020, 1026 (2008). (“We therefore hold that although § 502(a)(2) does not provide a 
remedy for individual injuries distinct from plan injuries, that provision does authorize recovery for 
fiduciary breaches that impair the value of plan assets in a participant’s individual account.”). 
 127. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 128. 128 S. Ct. at 1027 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  
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term “appropriate” in “appropriate equitable relief” appears to have 
been interpreted to mean that its provisions can only provide relief if 
there is no remedy available under sections 502(a)(1)(B) or 502(a)(2).129 
That being said, the potential scope of this section has been most 
dramatically impacted by the interpretation of “equitable” in the case of 
Mertens v. Hewitt Associates.130 In Mertens, Hewitt Associates was a plan 
service provider who assisted in a breach of fiduciary duty in making 
inaccurate actuarial predictions for the company’s defined benefits 
plan.131 The question presented by the case was whether a nonfiduciary, 
like Hewitt, could be found liable under section 502(a)(3).132 
Not only did the Supreme Court find that nonfiduciaries could not 
be sued for assisting breaches of fiduciary duties under section 502(a)(3), 
but the Court also discussed what types of remedies are permissible.133 
Purporting to rely on the meaning of equity during “the days of the 
divided bench,”134 the Court inexplicably interpreted “appropriate 
equitable relief” to mean only “injunction, mandamus, and restitution.”135 
Money damages, such as compensatory or punitive damages, are 
excluded.136 
This decision has sharply curtailed the nature of relief available 
under section 502(a)(3) and has set into motion over the last fifteen years 
a series of Supreme Court cases that can only be characterized as bizarre 
and contrary to the original purposes of ERISA. For instance, in two 
plan reimbursement cases,137 the Court has further divided restitution 
into claims for legal restitution (not recoverable) and equitable 
restitution (recoverable) in Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. 
Knudson138 and Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc.139 To 
 
 129. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 515 (1996). 
 130. 508 U.S. 248 (1993). 
 131. Id. at 250. 
 132. Id. at 251. 
 133. Id. at 261–62. 
 134. Great-W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 212 (2002) (“the days of the 
divided bench” refers to a time in American jurisprudence when there were separate courts of law and 
equity). 
 135. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256. The Court’s interpretation is especially inexplicable because 
mandamus was never a remedy in equity and restitution did not exist during the days of the divided 
bench. See Langbein, supra note 3, at 1353–54. 
 136. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 255. 
 137. Plan reimbursement clauses in the self-insured health plan context are similar to subrogation 
clauses in the insured plan context. The difference, however, is that whereas in a subrogation claim the 
insurance company may sue the tortfeasor directly, in a reimbursement claim the participant must first 
sue and recover from the third-party tortfeasor before the plan has a claim for reimbursement. See 
FMC Med. Plan v. Owens, 122 F.3d 1258, 1260 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 138. 534 U.S. 204, 213–14 (2002). 
 139. 547 U.S. 356, 362–63 (2006). There is an argument that Sereboff actually might signal a retreat 
from Great-West, by perhaps limiting Great-West to its facts. See Posting of Colleen Medill to 
Workplace Prof Blog, Sereboff and the Future of ERISA Remedies, http:// 
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prevail under a theory of equitable restitution, an ERISA plaintiff must 
show that the funds that the plan seeks to have reimbursed are 
specifically identifiable funds in the possession of the defendant that 
rightfully belong to the plaintiff.140 It is hard to believe that that was what 
the ERISA drafters meant in providing for “appropriate equitable 
relief.”141 
One question that still remains undecided is whether individuals 
suing for breach of fiduciary duty under section 502(a)(3) may recover 
make-whole damages like back pay.142 It is clear, on the one hand, that 
individual plaintiffs may seek to bring fiduciary claims for individual 
equitable relief under Varity Corp. v. Howe.143 The forms of appropriate 
equitable relief permitted in these cases, on the other hand, are 
debatable because the Varity case itself included a concession by the 
employer that the requested remedy was equitable.144 
It is therefore unclear whether the payment of a monetary award to 
make the victims of the breach whole would be considered an equitable 
remedy under section 502(a)(3).145 Also, there is some question under 
wrongful discharge and retaliation cases under section 510 as to whether 
participants may get back pay as a type of make-whole, equitable relief.146 
 
lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog/2006/05/sereboff_and_th.html (May 20, 2006, 11:06 pm) 
(“After Sereboff, . . . the scope of potential remedies that could qualify as ‘equitable’ under Section 
502(a)(3) is going to broaden out considerably, having been freed of strict compliance with all of the 
possible (ancient) technical requirements for relief imposed by a chancery court of equity.”). 
 140. Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 362–63. 
 141. As Professor Langbein aptly put it, Russell, Mertens, and Great-West were “greeted with 
despair in the scholarly and practitioner literature.” Langbein, supra note 3, at 1320; see, e.g., Randall 
J. Gingiss, The ERISA Foxtrot: Current Jurisprudence Takes One Step Forward and One Step Back in 
Protecting Participants’ Rights, 18 Va. Tax Rev. 417, 433 (1998); Muir, supra note 4, at 439; Karl J. 
Stoecker, ERISA Remedies After Varity Corp. v. Howe, 9 DePaul Bus. L.J. 237, 243 (1997); Paul 
O’Neil, Protecting ERISA Health Care Claimants: Practical Assessment of a Neglected Issue in Health 
Care Reform, 55 Ohio St. L.J. 723, 745–46 (1994); Larry J. Pittman, ERISA’s Preemption Clause and 
the Health Care Industry: An Abdication of Judicial Law-Creating Authority, 46 Fla. L. Rev. 355, 435–
36 (1994); Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, Closing the Gap: Safeguarding Participants’ Rights by Expanding 
the Federal Common Law of ERISA, 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 671, 673–74 (1994). 
 142. Back pay generally refers to restoring a plaintiff to the “status quo ante”; that is, to the 
position he or she would have occupied had his or her ERISA rights not been violated. See Lorraine 
Schmall & Nathan Ihnes, Failure of Equity: Discriminatory Plant Closings as an Irremediable Injury 
Under ERISA, 55 Cath. U. L. Rev. 81, 117–18 (2005). But see Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 
368 F.3d 1246, 1257–59 (10th Cir. 2004) (rejecting the argument that back pay is available as an 
equitable remedy under ERISA simply because it is considered equitable under Title VII, reasoning 
that ERISA protects the integrity of pension and health care plans generally whereas Title VII is a 
make-whole statute). 
 143. 516 U.S. 489, 515 (1996). 
 144. Id. at 508. 
 145. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 223–34 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 146. For an argument that the Great-West decision does not permit back pay for wrongful 
termination as an equitable remedy under section 502(a)(3), see Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 
368 F.3d 1246, 1257–59 (10th Cir. 2004), which holds that back pay as equitable relief is not available 
under section 502(a)(3) for violation of section 510. For criticisms of this approach and holding, see 
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Some Justices have even beseeched Congress to clarify these issues by 
legislating in this area.147 
In all, then, the combination of limited remedies for denial of 
benefits claims and the narrow construal of breach of fiduciary claims 
and other types of claims for ERISA violations has meant that the 
Supreme Court has largely been successful in limiting the remedies 
available for plaintiffs under ERISA. 
II.  The ERISA Intersectionality Problem 
Having set forth the roots of the intersectionality problem through a 
discussion of the current state of ERISA preemption and remedies in 
Part I, this Part first seeks to examine the matter in which 
intersectionality cases arise, with a focus on the concepts of complete 
preemption and conflict preemption. Second, it explores a number of 
cases that demonstrate this problem in action. 
A. The Characteristics of ERISA Intersectionality Problems 
The recognition of intersectionality problems has existed at least 
since Judge Stanley Birch dissented in the 1992 case of Sanson v. General 
Motors Corp.148 There, Judge Birch noted that the combined impact of 
ERISA’s broad preemption provisions and its limited remedial 
provisions act together to defeat the primary purpose of ERISA to 
protect employee benefits.149 Both the doctrines of complete preemption 
and conflict preemption contribute to the ERISA intersectionality 
problem. Complete preemption operates so that states are not free to 
pass laws that would add additional remedies to the current ERISA 
remedial scheme.150 Under conflict preemption, plaintiffs are forced out 
of state court to seek relief for wrongful acts of employers and plan 
administrators and must bring their claims under the narrow ERISA 
remedial framework.151 Finally, conflict preemption works to help 
preempt state laws that are otherwise saved as laws regulating insurance 
 
Schmall & Ihnes, supra note 142, at 118, and see also Harthill, supra note 14, at 723. 
 147. Davila, 542 U.S. at 222 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 148. 966 F.2d 618, 623 (11th Cir. 1992) (Birch, J., dissenting). 
 149. Id. at 625 (“[T]he combination [of the employee’s] state cause of action [being] preempted by 
ERISA even while ERISA denies him any alternative remedy . . . is disappointingly pernicious to the 
very goals and desires that motivated Congress to enact pension laws in the first place.”). 
 150. Davila, 542 U.S. at 216 (“Congress’ intent to make the ERISA civil enforcement mechanism 
exclusive would be undermined if state causes of action that supplement the ERISA § 502(a) remedies 
were permitted, even if the elements of the state cause of action did not precisely duplicate the 
elements of an ERISA claim.”)  
 151. Id. at 217–18 (“Under ordinary principles of conflict pre-emption, . . . even a state law that can 
arguably be characterized as ‘regulating insurance’ will be pre-empted if it provides a separate vehicle 
to assert a claim for benefits outside of, or in addition to, ERISA’s remedial scheme.”)  
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under ERISA’s saving clause.152 In short, once intersectionality analysis is 
applied in all of its dimensions, there is little left for ERISA plaintiffs 
except for the exclusive, limited, and ineffectual remedial scheme under 
section 502(a). 
1. Complete Preemption and Intersectionality 
Starting with the case of Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. 
Taylor,153 the Supreme Court developed the doctrine of complete 
preemption within the ERISA context. Taylor explains, in the context of 
a state-law claim for disability benefits, that Congress intended to so 
completely preempt employee benefits law through enactment of ERISA 
that any state-law complaint raising a claim for denial of employment 
benefits is necessarily federal in character.154 This means that such state 
denial of benefits claims can be removed to federal court and treated like 
an ERISA claim.155 Put differently, “the ERISA civil enforcement 
mechanism is one of those provisions with such ‘extraordinary 
preemptive power’ that it ‘converts an ordinary state common law 
complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-
pleaded complaint rule.’”156 
For example, in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, the Supreme 
Court held that Mississippi common law claims for tort, contract, and bad 
faith were preempted by ERISA.157 A secondary, but equally important, 
holding of that case created a connection between ERISA’s broad 
preemption scheme and its limited remedial provisions.158 In this vein, the 
Court concluded that allowing plaintiff’s common law claims would 
undermine ERISA’s remedial scheme under section 502(a).159 The 
majority in Pilot Life argued that Congress intended ERISA to serve as 
the exclusive means of remedying violations under ERISA.160 In other 
words, permitting the plaintiff’s state law claims was inconsistent with the 
“comprehensive and reticulated” nature of these provisions as discussed 
in Russell a couple of years before: 
 
 152. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).  
 153. 481 U.S. 58 (1987). 
 154. Id. at 66–67. 
 155. This doctrine does not usually apply outside of a few areas of the law because the “well-
pleaded” complaint rule requires normally that the federal question be in the plaintiff’s complaint, not 
in the defendant’s answer. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 
U.S. 1, 9–10 (1983). Professor Medill has aptly referred to complete preemption as the “really badly 
pleaded complaint exception” to the “well pleaded complaint rule.” See Medill, supra note 103, at 
511. 
 156. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 209 (2004) (quoting Taylor, 481 U.S. at 65–66). 
 157. 481 U.S. 41, 48 (1987).  
 158. See id. at 54. 
 159. Id. at 57. 
 160. Id. 
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  The deliberate care with which ERISA’s civil enforcement remedies 
were drafted and the balancing of policies embodied in its choice of 
remedies argue strongly for the conclusion that ERISA’s civil 
enforcement remedies were intended to be exclusive. This conclusion 
is fully confirmed by the legislative history of the civil enforcement 
provision.161 
For reasons discussed elsewhere, this is not a plaintiff-friendly 
development because plaintiffs would rather not have to bring their 
claims under section 502(a)(1)(B), with its procedural difficulties and its 
remedies being limited to the value of the benefits denied.162 
2. The Savings Clause, Preemption, and Intersectionality 
But even where ordinary preemption does not exist for a claim 
under section 514(a), because that claim is under a state law that 
regulates insurance, complete preemption can still be utilized to remove 
the claim from state court to federal court under ERISA. For example, in 
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, in which a claim was brought under an 
alternative remedial scheme against HMOs under Texas law, the state-
law claim was found to be completely preempted and removal of the 
claim to federal court was permitted.163 Thereafter, even though the state-
law claim was saved, the Court found that a conflict preemption override 
operated to invalidate the state law claim because that claim expanded 
the remedies otherwise available under section 502(a)(1)(B).164 The 
conflict preemption override exists so that additional remedies are not 
available under state law and so that the fundamental purpose of 
creating a uniform body of federal law to govern employee benefits plans 
can be maintained.165 This state of affairs also leads to only limited 
remedies being available under ERISA, which by extension means the 
subsidiary purpose of ERISA—to keep the costs of adopting employee 
benefits plans inexpensive for employers—is also furthered.166 
So, the Court in Davila appeared to be making a connection 
between limited ERISA remedies and the secondary policy of keeping 
plan costs low for plan sponsors. Although the Court paid lip service to 
the primary purpose of protecting employee benefits, its devotion to 
keeping plan costs low meant that it could not accept a structural 
interpretation of ERISA which would lead to broader remedies for plan 
 
 161. Id. This last sentence about legislative history is just not accurate, as explored infra note 204. 
 162. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 163.  542 U.S. 200, 204 (2004).  
 164. Id. at 217–18 (“Under ordinary principles of conflict pre-emption, then, even a state law that 
can arguably be characterized as ‘regulating insurance’ will be pre-empted if it provides a separate 
vehicle to assert a claim for benefits outside of, or in addition to, ERISA’s remedial scheme.”). 
 165. Id. at 217.  
 166. Id. at 215 (“The limited remedies available under ERISA are an inherent part of the ‘careful 
balancing’ between ensuring fair and prompt enforcement of rights under a plan and the 
encouragement of the creation of such plans.” (quoting Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 55)). 
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participants and beneficiaries. In short, complete preemption, conflict 
preemption, limited remedies, and the elevation of a secondary purpose 
of ERISA all work together to keep employees from receiving adequate 
relief under either state law or ERISA. 
3. Intersectionality Problems Under Sections 502(a)(2) and 
502(a)(3) 
Although not as common, even outside of section 502(a)(1)(B) and 
complete preemption, preemption can act to force state-law claims into 
federal court where they will be treated as federal claims under ERISA. 
In other words, even though the lower courts are divided over whether 
complete preemption even applies to sections 502(a)(2) and 502(a)(3),167 
the intersectionality problem still potentially exists under sections 
502(a)(2) and 502(a)(3).168 So, for instance, if a state-law claim is brought 
for misconduct against a plan fiduciary and the claim can be recast as one 
for a breach of fiduciary duty claim, or if a wrongful discharge claim is 
brought and can be recast as a discrimination claim relating to benefits 
under section 510, such claims can be found to “relate to” employee 
benefits plans.169 As such, they are also conflict preempted into ERISA’s 
limited remedial scheme. 
B. Case Examples of the ERISA Intersectionality Problem 
The impact of this state of affairs can be seen in numerous harsh 
decisions by lower federal courts. Pilot Life and its progeny now stand 
for the broader proposition that state common law claims having a 
connection with an employee benefits plan are preempted. 
Consequently, this principle has been relied on in defeating state law 
claims for both plan administrators wrongfully denying or delaying 
claims made under an employee benefits plan and for wrongful discharge 
claims related to participants’ exercise of their rights under an employee 
benefits plan. 
 
 167. Compare Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d 1311, 1314 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding 
complete preemption for state law claims under section 502(a)), with Lupo v. Human Affairs Int’l, 
Inc., 28 F.3d 269, 270 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding no complete preemption for state law claims). 
 168. There is no removal issue under sections 502(a)(2) and 502(a)(3) because section 502(e) 
provides for exclusive jurisdiction in federal court for these types of claims. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e) 
(2006). On the other hand, federal and state courts have dual jurisdiction under section 502(a)(1)(B). 
See id. 
 169. See, e.g., Danca v. Private Health Care Sys., Inc., 185 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1999) (preempting 
negligence claims as “alternative enforcement mechanisms” for section 502(a)(2)); Romney v. Lin, 94 
F.3d 74, 81 (2d Cir. 1996) (preempting state collections law because section 502(a)(3) already provided 
a means for collecting delinquent ERISA contributions). 
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1. Intersectionality and Denial of Benefits Claims 
As far as wrongful denial of benefits claim scenarios, few are better 
known than the case of Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc.170 In 
Corcoran, a health plan denied a female plan participant extended 
hospital stay services for a high risk pregnancy.171 The participant ended 
up losing her baby, and she and her husband sued the plan for wrongful 
death and under other tort theories of law.172 The court held, however, 
that they could only bring a section 502(a)(1)(B) claim under ERISA 
because the health plan’s decision to deny the requested benefits was an 
employee-benefits-related eligibility determination, not a medical 
decision which could be subject to a medical malpractice claim.173 Hence, 
the application of both ERISA preemption and the exclusive nature of 
the limited remedial scheme jointly prevented the parents from bringing 
a state tort claim for compensatory and punitive damages for the loss of 
their child.174 
Corcoran thus provides a jarring example of the intersectionality 
problem and how ERISA civil enforcement and preemption provisions 
work in tandem to deny employee benefits plan participants meaningful 
relief for their losses caused by wrongful benefits decisions.175 Even the 
judges deciding the case recognized the horrible inequities involved in a 
case like this: 
This [case outcome] is troubling for several reasons. First, it eliminates 
an important check on the thousands of medical decisions routinely 
made in the burgeoning utilization review system. With liability rules 
generally inapplicable, there is theoretically less deterrence of 
substandard medical decisionmaking. Moreover, if the cost of 
compliance with a standard of care (reflected either in the cost of 
prevention or the cost of paying judgments) need not be factored into 
utilization review companies’ cost of doing business, bad medical 
judgments will end up being cost-free to the plans that rely on these 
companies to contain medical costs.176 
Corcoran is not alone in causing injustice in the denial-of-benefits 
context where consequential injuries are involved.177 In fact, the Supreme 
 
 170. 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992). Professor Muir also discusses this case as evidence of the need 
for better remedies under ERISA. See Muir, supra note 4, at 440. 
 171. 965 F.2d at 1324. 
 172. Id. 
 173. See id. at 1338 (“The result ERISA compels us to reach means that the Corcorans have no 
remedy, state or federal, for what may have been a serious mistake.”). 
 174. Id. 
 175. See Medill, supra note 4, at 843 (“The remedy offered by Section 502(a)(1)(B) in managed 
care cases provides cold comfort to the widow or widower of the participant, and effectively no 
compensation for the participant who has incurred personal injury or economic loss as a result of the 
wrongfully denied claim for medical treatment.”). 
 176. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1338. 
 177. For another heart-wrenching example, see Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83, 87–88 (2d Cir. 2003), 
where the plan’s refusal to pre-authorize a medical treatment for cancer—recommended by a 
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Court case of Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila178 illustrates another less tragic 
but nonetheless recurrent scenario. Remember that in Davila the 
plaintiffs sought consequential damages under state law for wrongful 
denial of their claims by their HMOs which allegedly caused serious 
injuries to them.179 The Supreme Court held that even if the Texas state 
HMO law were saved from complete preemption, that law was still 
preempted based on conflict preemption override.180 So rather than 
receiving consequential damages for the benefits decisions that led to 
harmful consequences, the plaintiffs were stuck under section 
502(a)(1)(B) and could only obtain the inadequate value of the services 
initially denied.181 All of this was done in the name of keeping remedies 
under ERISA limited so that employers would continue to offer 
employee benefits plans.182 In other words, the Supreme Court in Davila 
promoted a secondary purpose of containing plan costs (not in ERISA) 
over the primary purpose of protecting employee benefits (directly in the 
statute), and in the process, continued to construe the remedial sections 
of ERISA in a way that is inconsistent with ERISA’s clear legislative 
history.183 
2.  Intersectionality and Wrongful Discharge Claims 
A similar cruel reality exists for claims brought for interference with 
ERISA rights under section 510. Section 510 prohibits discriminating 
against, retaliating against, or interfering with an employee’s exercise of 
his or her rights under ERISA.184 Such claims require that the plaintiff 
establish that the defendant has the intent to interfere with rights 
protected by ERISA.185 Relief for violations of section 510 is available 
under section 502(a)(3) for “appropriate equitable relief.”186 
 
participant’s treating physician—led to the deterioration of the participant’s physical condition to the 
point where the recommended treatment was no longer a viable medical option by the time it was 
finally authorized, and the patient died shortly thereafter. 
 178. 542 U.S. 200 (2004). 
 179. Mr. Davila’s injuries resulted from Aetna’s refusal to pay for his Vioxx and the severe allergic 
reaction he suffered when he took Naprosyn instead, which subsequently required extensive treatment 
and hospitalization. Id. at 205. Ms. Calad, on the other hand, underwent surgery and, although her 
treating physician recommended an extended hospital stay, CIGNA refused the request and she 
allegedly experienced postsurgery complications forcing her to return to the hospital. Id. 
 180. Id. at 217–18. 
 181. See id. at 221. On the other hand, a state law providing for independent review of benefits 
denials in Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 379–80 (2002), did not provide 
additional remedies outside ERISA and, therefore, was saved from preemption as a law regulating 
insurance. So it appears states can provide additional procedural protection through laws that regulate 
insurance, but not additional remedies for the consequences of benefits denial. 
 182. See Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 515 (1981) (noting that ERISA’s 
primary goal was to benefit employees and that a secondary goal was to contain costs); see also 29 
U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2006). 
 183. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 184. 29 U.S.C. § 1140. 
 185. See Schmall & Ihnes, supra note 142, at 107 (“A plaintiff’s claim under ERISA section 510 
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Yet a number of cases involving state law claims for wrongful 
discharge relating to employee benefits matters have been found 
completely preempted and limited to the sections 510/502(a)(3) 
framework.187 For example, in Anderson v. Electronic Data Systems 
Corp., the plaintiff brought a tort claim in Texas state court based on 
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy when his employer 
demoted and discharged him for his refusal to commit illegal acts and for 
reporting the activities of another employee, both in relation to a pension 
plan.188 Under the doctrine of complete preemption, the defendants 
removed the claim to federal court and the district court dismissed it 
because the complaint only contained a state law claim.189 
Relying on Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon,190 which also involved 
a state court action alleging wrongful discharge based on the employer’s 
desire to avoid making contributions to his pension plan,191 the court 
found that the state action would conflict with the express and carefully 
crafted enforcement provisions found in the ERISA statute, specifically 
sections 510 and 502(a)(3).192 Thus, applying the complete preemption 
principle to these claims, the court found the state court action was 
properly removed to federal court and then dismissed.193 In a last 
observation, the Anderson court noted that “such a finding of 
preemption does not hinge on whether ERISA provides the remedy the 
 
must demonstrate specific intent by the employer to interfere with an employee’s benefits . . . .” (citing 
Rush v. United Techs., 930 F.2d 453, 457 (6th Cir. 1991))). 
 186. See Ingersoll-Rand v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 144 (1990). 
 187. See, e.g., Wood v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 207 F.3d 674, 679 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding 
allegations that Prudential discriminated against Wood by terminating his employment to avoid paying 
benefits completely preempted by section 510). 
 188. 11 F.3d 1311, 1312 (5th Cir. 1994).  
 189.  Id. at 1315. Although the court dismissed the case in Anderson, state claims may be treated as 
federal claims under ERISA section 502(a) and analyzed as such. See Wood, 207 F.3d at 682 
(Stapleton, J., dissenting) (“If a claim based on state law is completely preempted, however, it is 
treated as a federal claim; a district court has federal question removal jurisdiction to entertain it, and 
the claim, after removal, should go forward in the district court as a federal claim.”). Of course, one 
problem then from the plaintiff’s standpoint is that the claim may be stale. See Watson v. Hartford Life 
& Accident Ins. Co., 589 F. Supp. 2d 452, 455–56 (D. Del. 2008) (dismissing completely preempted 
section 502(a) claim for failing to meet the applicable ERISA statute of limitations). Another problem 
is that he or she may not be able to get a desirable remedy under the limited ERISA remedial scheme. 
See Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1333 (5th Cir. 1992) (“The acknowledged 
absence of a remedy under ERISA’s civil enforcement scheme for medical malpractice committed in 
connection with a plan benefit determination does not alter our conclusion. . . . [T]he lack of an 
ERISA remedy does not affect a pre-emption analysis.”). 
 190. 498 U.S. 133 (1990). 
 191. See supra notes 37–43 and accompanying text. 
 192. Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1314. 
 193. Id. (“McClendon compels us to conclude that Anderson’s wrongful discharge claim is 
preempted insofar as it is based on his refusal to carry out violations of ERISA, and reporting such 
violations to management.”). But see King v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 428 (4th Cir. 2003) 
(criticizing Anderson because “[w]e simply do not agree that the language of section 510 can be ‘fairly 
construed’ to extend to [intra-office reports in a whistleblower context]”). 
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plaintiff seeks or any remedy at all for the alleged wrong.”194 To 
paraphrase, the Anderson court saw its function as mechanistically 
applying the existing law of preemption and civil enforcement under 
ERISA. And if deserving plaintiffs were left with a right without a 
remedy, then so be it. 
Because it is the central theme of this Article that Congress enacted 
ERISA to provide “appropriate remedies” for employee benefits plan 
violations that impact participants and beneficiaries,195 the following two 
Parts propose both judicial and legislative fixes to this intersectionality 
problem that leads to an unjust “right without remedy” statutory ruse. 
III.  The Judicial Fix: Embracing the Remedial Nature of ERISA 
The current split on the Court over the meaning and scope of 
ERISA’s remedial provisions provides an opportunity for future courts 
in these types of ERISA intersectionality cases. Assuming that expansive 
ERISA preemption will continue to lead to the preemption of state-law 
claims, this Article focuses on the current, and erroneous, interpretation 
of ERISA remedies as being limited. By reviewing the debate between 
the literalist and remedialist Justices in the section 502(a) context since 
Russell, the hope is to persuade the Supreme Court to recognize how the 
broad remedialist view is more consistent with ERISA’s purpose, its text, 
its structure, and its legislative history. 
This Part is divided into two sections. Section A reviews the 
arguments put forth by the literalist and remedialist Justices in ERISA 
preemption and civil enforcement cases. Section B makes the argument 
that the literalist Justices’ view based on “the days of the divided 
bench”196 should be discarded and the Court should instead embrace a 
broad remedial scheme, derived from the common law of trusts.197 
 
 194.  Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1314; see also Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1333; Hansen v. Continental Ins. 
Co., 940 F.2d 971, 979 (5th Cir. 1991) (“This Court has held that ERISA’s preemption provision bars 
state law causes of action even though such preemption may leave a victim . . . without a remedy.”). 
 195. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2006) (“It is hereby declared to be the policy of this chapter to 
protect interstate commerce and the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their 
beneficiaries . . . by providing for appropriate remedies . . . .”); see also Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 
489, 515 (1996) (“We are not aware of any ERISA-related purpose that denial of a remedy would 
serve. Rather, we believe that granting a remedy is consistent with the literal language of the statute, 
the Act’s purposes, and pre-existing trust law.”). 
 196. Great-W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 212 (2002). 
 197. See Langbein, supra note 3, at 1319 (“ERISA is, in its most important dimension, federal trust 
law.”). 
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A. Statutory Interpretation at the Heart of the Intersectionality 
Problem 
1. Russell and the Literalist Versus Remedialist Debate 
As discussed above,198 almost from the very first case dealing with 
the civil enforcement provisions of section 502(a) of ERISA, a division 
has existed on the U.S. Supreme Court between a group of Justices who 
follow a literalist approach based on textual and structural arguments 
and a group of Justices who follow a remedialist approach based on the 
common law of trusts and the remedial nature of ERISA. Some Justices 
have changed sides over the years (e.g., Justice Stevens), and different 
groups have been successful in different cases over the years, but the 
divide persists. 
Recall that Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell, a 
section 502(a)(2) case, involved the question of whether the plaintiff 
could seek compensatory and punitive damages for breach of fiduciary 
duty beyond the receipt of retroactive benefits.199 The court was 
unanimous that such remedies did not exist,200 but it became a pivotal 
case because of the deep division it engendered between different groups 
of Justices on why such damage remedies were not available. 
The literalists, led by Justice Stevens, found first that based on the 
language of ERISA sections 502(a)(2) and 409, only the plan was able to 
receive relief, not an individual participant.201 Going further, Justice 
Stevens examined the structure of 502(a) and found that there were “six 
carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions” and that these 
provisions were an “interlocking, interrelated, and interdependent 
remedial scheme, which is in turn part of a ‘comprehensive and 
reticulated statute.’”202 As such, Justice Stevens concluded that Congress 
purposefully left out including any other types of remedies under section 
502(a).203 
The remedialist Justices, led by Justice Brennan, could not have 
disagreed more with the majority. Even putting to one side Justice 
Stevens’s claim concerning the purported legislative history of the 
drafting of ERISA,204 Justice Brennan believed that trust law should be 
 
 198. See supra notes 104–11 and accompanying text. 
 199. 473 U.S. 134, 136–38 (1985).  
 200. Id. at 148. 
 201. Id. at 140.  
 202. Id. at 146 (quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980)).  
 203. Id. at 147 (“We are reluctant to tamper with an enforcement scheme crafted with such evident 
care as the one in ERISA.”). 
 204. See id. at 145–46. Although Justice Stevens was aware of the “voluminous legislative history 
of the Act,” see id. at 145, his subsequent statement about that history calls into doubt whether he was 
aware of all the relevant language in that record. In particular, he failed to note that both the House 
and Senate Committee reports indicated that the enforcement provisions were intended to “provide 
both the Secretary and participants and beneficiaries with broad remedies for redressing or preventing 
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the starting point for the interpretation of these remedial provisions since 
Congress intended to incorporate trust law into ERISA’s equitable 
remedies.205 The remedialist view would require “ascertaining the extent 
to which trust and pension law as developed by state and federal courts 
provide for recovery by the beneficiary above and beyond the benefits 
that have been withheld.”206 
This view is also consistent with the statutory text and the 
characterization of ERISA as a remedial statute. As for the literalist view 
on the text, Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Russell examined section 
502(a)(3) and noted that by its very terms, it allowed for “appropriate 
equitable relief” to “‘redress’ ‘any act or practice which violates any 
provision of this title or the terms of the plan.’”207 As for the structure of 
section 502(a), the remedialists maintained that, far from being a 
carefully-calibrated, limited remedial scheme, ERISA called for the 
development of a federal common law to “fine-tune” ERISA’s remedial 
provisions.208 
2. The Back-and-Forth Debate from Mertens to Sereboff 
The literalists had the votes and won the first battle in this war of 
ERISA statutory interpretation in Russell, but that debate continues with 
mostly different Justices (Justice Stevens being the only one left from 
Russell and now on the side of the remedialists). 
In Mertens v. Hewitt Associates,209 discussed in detail in Part I.B, the 
issue was whether or not a nonfiduciary service provider could be held 
liable under section 502(a)(3) for money damages for assisting in a 
fiduciary’s breach of fiduciary duty.210 The Court, with Justice Scalia now 
writing for the literalist majority, ruled five-to-four that damage remedies 
could never be “appropriate equitable relief” under section 502(a)(3) 
 
violations of [ERISA].” See S. Rep. No. 93-127, at 35 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 
4871; H.R. Rep. No. 93-533, at 17 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4655; see also Robert N. 
Eccles & David E. Gordon, Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson: Supreme Court 
Announces That It Was Not Kidding in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates., ERISA Litig. Rep., Feb. 2002, 
at 6–8 (quoting an e-mail from Michael Gordon, one of the chief legislative architects of ERISA, in 
which he maintained that references to “legal” relief were taken out of the final version of Section 
502(a) to avoid “creat[ing] another cross for ERISA to bear as opponents of ERISA were . . . looking 
for any opportunity at hand to stop the bill’s enactment.”). 
 205. Russell, 473 U.S. at 157 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 153. 
 208. Id. at 155–57 (“ERISA’s legislative history also demonstrates beyond question that Congress 
intended to engraft trust-law principles onto the enforcement scheme, and a fundamental concept of 
trust law is that courts ‘will give to the beneficiaries of a trust such remedies as are necessary for the 
protection of their interests.’ Thus ERISA was not so ‘carefully integrated’ and ‘crafted’ as to preclude 
further judicial delineation of appropriate rights and remedies; far from barring such a process, the 
statute explicitly directs that courts shall undertake it.” (citation omitted) (footnote omitted) (quoting 
3 A. Scott, Law of Trusts § 199, at 1638 (1967))). 
 209. 508 U.S. 248 (1993). 
 210. Id. at 249–50. 
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because “[m]oney damages are, of course, the classic form of legal 
relief.”211 Instead, only those remedies typically available in equity, 
“injunction, mandamus, and restitution,” were available.212 
In coming to this conclusion, Justice Scalia rejected the law of trust 
as a starting point and dubiously relied on “the days of the divided 
bench”213 before the merger of the law and equity courts to conclude that 
no type of monetary damages, even if incidental to equitable relief, were 
available under section 502(a)(3).214 This interpretation was consistent 
with the literalist Justices’ structural views of ERISA’s enforcement 
scheme as being a well-crafted, limited statute and it being necessary to 
differentiate between the equitable relief available under section 
502(a)(3) and the legal relief available under other parts of the statute.215 
Of course, why it is necessary to go back hundreds of years to determine 
the meaning of “equitable” in a statute passed in 1974 is anyone’s 
guess.216 
The four remedialist justices,217 supported by the solicitor general 
and following Justice Brennan’s lead in Russell, found that under the 
common law of trusts, relief for breach of a trust had historically 
included make-whole money damages: 
[T]here being no common-law tradition either in law or in equity to 
which Congress might direct the courts, it is not at all surprising that 
Congress would refer to both legal and equitable relief in making clear 
that the courts are free to craft whatever relief is most appropriate. It 
seems . . . a treacherous leap to draw from these sections a 
congressional intention to foreclose compensatory monetary awards 
under § 502(a)(3) notwithstanding that such awards had always been 
considered “appropriate equitable relief” for breach of trust at 
common law.218 
It was inequitable, in the dissent’s view, that the majority’s approach 
“stripped ERISA trust beneficiaries of a remedy against trustees and 
third parties that they enjoyed in the equity courts under common 
 
 211. Id. at 255. 
 212. Id. at 256. Langbein has shown the folly of this statement, especially with regard to the fact 
that neither mandamus nor restitution was typically available in equity. See Langbein, supra note 3, at 
1353–54. 
 213. See Great-W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 212 (2002). 
 214. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256–57. 
 215. Id. at 258–59. 
 216. See Great-West, 534 U.S. at 224–25 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“By 1974, when ERISA became 
law, the ‘days of the divided bench’ were a fading memory, for that era had ended nearly 40 years 
earlier with the advent of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Those rules instruct: ‘There shall be 
one form of action’ cognizable in the federal courts.” (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 2)). 
 217. The remedialists included Justice White, writing in dissent, but for the first time included 
former literalists: Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O’Connor, and Justice Stevens. See Mertens, 508 
U.S. at 249. On the other hand, Justice Blackmun joined the literalists in this opinion and Justice 
Souter started out as one. See id. 
 218. Id. at 269 (White, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
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law.”219 In other words, ERISA was enacted to increase protections of 
employee benefits, not to diminish those protections. 
Instead, the focus of the literalists seemed to be on making sure that 
sponsoring employee benefits plans was not expensive so that employers 
would continue to provide them to their employees.220 The lowering of 
administrative costs for plan sponsors is a “subsidiary” goal under 
ERISA,221 but not one that is mentioned in the statute and clearly, 
therefore, not on the same par as the primary purpose of providing 
benefits to wronged employees. Yet in limiting the relief under section 
502(a)(3), the literalists appear set on limiting remedies in order to meet 
this all-important subsidiary goal of containing the costs of sponsoring 
employee benefits plans, even though this interpretation of ERISA 
necessarily undermines the primary purpose of the statute: to provide 
appropriate sanctions to protect the employee benefits of participants 
and their beneficiaries.222 
Three years later, in Varity Corp. v. Howe,223 the remedialists224 
gained the upper hand, albeit arguably limiting the section 502(a)(3) 
remedy further by defining the term “appropriate” in “appropriate 
equitable relief.”225 Varity involved a breach of fiduciary duty, and the 
issue was whether individuals could advance a claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty under section 502(a)(3).226 In the six-to-three decision, 
written by Justice Breyer, the Court held that ERISA authorized an 
individual action for breach of fiduciary duty under section 502(a)(3).227 
The remedialists characterized this section as a “‘catchall’ remedial 
section,” which provides remedies beyond those found in section 
502(a)(2).228 
 
 219. Id. at 263. 
 220. Id. at 262–63 (majority opinion) (“Exposure to that sort of liability would impose high 
insurance costs upon persons who regularly deal with and offer advice to ERISA plans, and hence 
upon ERISA plans themselves. There is, in other words, a ‘tension between the primary [ERISA] goal 
of benefiting employees and the subsidiary goal of containing pension costs.’” (alteration in original) 
(quoting Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 515 (1981))). 
 221. Id. 
 222. See supra note 3. 
 223. 516 U.S. 489 (1996). 
 224. The remedialists now consisted of Justice Breyer, who wrote the majority opinion in Varity; 
Justices Souter and Kennedy, who changed sides; Chief Justice Rehnquist; and Justices Ginsburg and 
Stevens. See id. at 491. Justice O’Connor went back to the literalist side with Justices Scalia and 
Thomas. See id. 
 225. Id. at 515. 
 226. Id. at 495–96. 
 227. Id. at 515. 
 228. Id. at 512. As section 502(a)(2) is the only provision that permits individuals to sue for 
fiduciary breach, the majority in Varity concluded that the plaintiffs had a claim and that such a claim 
would play an important deterrent function in protecting against wrongful conduct by fiduciaries. Id. 
at 510–12. In this vein, the majority found it “hard to imagine why Congress would want to immunize 
breaches of fiduciary obligation that harm individuals by denying injured beneficiaries a remedy.” Id. 
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Interestingly, the remedialists turned the structural argument 
against the literalists, finding that although sections 502(a)(1)(B) and 
502(a)(2) claims focused on specific areas, section 502(a)(3) was more 
general in providing for “appropriate equitable relief” for “‘any’ 
statutory violation.”229 However, in coming to this conclusion, the 
majority found that the word “appropriate” suggests that a remedy can 
only be had under section 502(a)(3) if section 502 does not elsewhere 
provide for an adequate remedy.230 Thus, although the opinion expands 
the notion of equitable relief available to individuals under ERISA, it 
also limits the statute’s scope by first asking whether any of the specific 
remedial provisions apply. Three literalist Justices dissented from the 
majority opinion, believing that such a catchall provision was inconsistent 
with their analysis in Russell and with the carefully crafted structure of 
section 502(a).231 
As it turns out, the remedialist victory was short-lived, as the 
literalists were back in control a mere six years later with the throw-back 
cases of Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson232 and 
Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc.233 Both of these cases 
involved plan reimbursement scenarios in which service providers were 
seeking reimbursement from participants for medical payments already 
made in third-party tort-recovery scenarios.234 For instance, in Great-
West, the issue was whether Great-West, a stop-loss insurer, could obtain 
reimbursement from the plan beneficiary after she collected money both 
from Great-West and from the third-party tortfeasor who had caused her 
car accident injuries.235 In both cases, the literalists pushed their analysis 
 
at 513. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. at 515 (“[T]he statute authorizes ‘appropriate’ equitable relief. . . . [W]here Congress 
elsewhere provided adequate relief for a beneficiary’s injury, there will likely be no need for further 
equitable relief, in which case such relief normally would not be ‘appropriate.’”). But see Medill, supra 
note 4, at 886–87. 
 231. Varity, 516 U.S. at 519 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Congress has enacted a comprehensive 
scheme and has deliberately targeted specific problems with specific solutions.”). 
 232. 534 U.S. 204 (2002). 
 233. 547 U.S. 356 (2006). 
 234. The participants had received third-party tort recoveries, and thus the service providers were 
seeking reimbursement for those damages already received from third parties. See Sereboff, 547 U.S. 
at 360; Great-West, 534 U.S. at 207–08.  
 235. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 208–09. Janette Knudson was rendered quadriplegic by a car accident 
in June 1992. Id. at 207. Her husband’s health plan covered $411,157.11 of her medical expenses. Id. 
Relying on a reimbursement provision in the plan, Great-West sought to require the Knudsons to pay 
the Plan $411,157.11 from any proceeds recovered from third parties. Id. at 207–08. In fact, in late 
1993, the Knudsons filed a tort action in California state court and a $650,000 settlement was 
negotiated with the perpetrator of the car accident: $256,745.30 to a special-needs trust to provide for 
Ms. Knudson’s medical care; $373,426 for attorney’s fees and costs; $5000 to reimburse the California 
Medicaid program; and $13,828.70 to satisfy Great-West’s claim under the reimbursement provision of 
the Plan. Id. 
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even further and divided the analysis between legal restitution and 
equitable restitution, with only the latter being available under section 
502(a)(3).236 So, in Great-West, the plan could not seek reimbursement 
under section 502(a)(3) because the funds were in a special-needs trust 
and not in the possession of the defendant.237 However, in Sereboff, such 
funds could be recovered (as an equitable lien by agreement) because 
there were specifically-identifiable funds in the possession of the 
defendant that rightfully belonged to the plaintiff service provider.238 In 
all, though, “[t]he spectrum of § 502(a)(3) relief contracted further in 
Great-West”239 and in Sereboff. 
The dissent in Great-West again criticized the anachronistic nature 
of the majority’s statutory interpretation, objecting that the analysis was 
not apt for “a distinctly modern statute Congress passed in 1974.”240 
Instead, the dissenting remedialist Justices said that the policy goals 
would have been met by allowing the reimbursement clause to have been 
enforced under section 502(a)(3) without having to worry about 
“antiquarian” notions of restitution law.241 
Great-West’s twisted reasoning, going back to the days of equity, 
causes even seasoned ERISA practitioners to refer to its holding as 
“revolutionary.”242 On the one hand, it embraces the Mertens analysis 
about “the days of the divided bench” and suggests that restitution may 
not be available for individual claims for fiduciary breach if there is not 
unjust enrichment.243 On the other hand, in a footnote, it suggests that 
equitable relief in the form of back pay may be available for claims of 
discrimination under a section 510 retaliation claim, but also that, “Title 
VII has nothing to do with this case.”244 Not surprisingly, then, it has been 
rightfully criticized as carrying out an erroneous historical analysis of 
equitable remedies and applying an incorrect mode of statutory 
interpretation to a modern remedial statute.245 
 
 236. Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 362; Great-West, 534 U.S. at 212–13. 
 237. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 214. 
 238. Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 362–63. 
 239. Amschwand v. Spherion Corp., 505 F.3d 342, 345 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 240. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 233 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“By 1974, when ERISA became law, 
the ‘days of the divided bench’ were a fading memory, for that era had ended nearly 40 years earlier 
with the advent of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”). 
 241. Id. at 233–234. 
 242. See, e.g., Eccles & Gordon, supra note 204, at 28. 
 243. See Great-West, 534 U.S. at 212–14. 
 244. Id. at 218–19 n.4. 
 245. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 3; Medill, supra note 4; Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s 
Judicial Passivity, 2002 Sup. Ct. Rev. 343 (2002); Colleen P. Murphy, Misclassifying Monetary 
Restitution, 55 SMU L. Rev. 1577 (2002); Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist 
Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78 Ind. L.J. 223 (2003); Schmall & Ihnes, supra note 142; 
Tracy A. Thomas, Justice Scalia Reinvents Restitution, 36 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1063 (2003). 
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Most recently, the Court had a chance to make another statement 
about the remedial scope of section 502(a)(3) in Amschwand v. Spherion 
Corp., which asks whether a participant or beneficiary in an ERISA 
health benefits plan may sue for the insurance benefits that would have 
been available but for a violation of a plan administrator’s duty.246 The 
Fifth Circuit had held that they were constrained by Great-West from 
granting make-whole relief under section 502(a)(3) for a breach of 
fiduciary duty.247 The case would have effectively teed up the issue of 
“make-whole relief” in an individual claim of fiduciary breach under 
ERISA. Yet, even though the Solicitor General recommended granting 
certiorari in Amschwand,248 the Supreme Court did not take the case,249 
and the issue remains very much alive at the time of the writing of this 
Article. 
 In short, a tension very much remains between the remedialist 
focus on the ability of courts to craft federal common law to decide issues 
not expressly reached by the text of ERISA and the literalist emphasis 
on the need to defer to the “carefully integrated”250 civil enforcement 
scheme. To this point, and not surprisingly because of the general 
majority the literalists have enjoyed on the Court since the 1985 Russell 
decision, lower courts have basically continued to engage in a literalist 
analysis of ERISA’s remedial provisions.251 But as one exasperated jurist 
recently put it, these types of cases “scream out for a remedy beyond the 
simple return of premiums.”252 
Considering this inequitable state of affairs under ERISA, the next 
section argues that reconsideration of the primary purpose of ERISA, as 
evidenced by its text, structure, and legislative history, inexorably lead to 
the conclusion that section 502(a)(3) should be interpreted by the 
Supreme Court to permit traditional trust law remedies of “make-whole” 
relief to rectify any act or practice that violates any provision of 
ERISA.253 
 
 246. 505 F.3d 342, 343 (5th Cir. 2007).  
 247. Id. 
 248. See Posting of Paul M. Secunda to Workplace Prof Blog, SG Urges Cert. in Hulteen and 
Amschwand, Not Gulino, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog/2008/05/sg-urges-cert-i.html 
(May 28, 2008); see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Amschwand v. Spherion Corp., 
128 S. Ct. 2995 (2008) (No. 07–841). 
 249. Amschwand, 505 F.3d 342, cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2995 (2008). 
 250. See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985). 
 251. See, e.g., Amschwand, 505 F.3d at 348 (“Because the remedy sought here was not typically 
available in pre-fusion courts of equity, we are obliged to follow the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Great-West and deny § 502(a)(3) relief.”). 
 252. Id. at 348–49 (Benavides, J., specially concurring). Judge Benavides continued, “Regrettably, 
under existing law it is not available.” Id. at 349. 
 253. At least two members of the current Court have signaled their willingness to reconsider the 
availability of consequential damages under section 502(a)(3). See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 
U.S. 200, 223 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“[F]resh consideration of the availability of 
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B. Embracing the Remedialist Approach of VARITY 
To return to the primary purpose of protecting employee benefits, a 
rather simple approach exists for expanding the scope of equitable relief 
by following the Varity case and limiting both Great-West and Sereboff to 
their facts as plan reimbursement cases.254 This approach is convincing 
because it resonates with ERISA’s primary purpose of providing a 
remedy for participants and beneficiaries. From a textual standpoint, the 
language of section 502(a)(3), as Justice Brennan pointed out almost 
twenty-five years ago, clearly contemplates equitable relief for “any” act 
or practice that violates “any” provision of ERISA.255 From a structural 
standpoint, six Justices agreed with Justice Breyer that although some of 
the remedial provisions are specific, section 502(a)(3) is a catchall 
provision that intimates the availability of a type of general relief to 
make the plaintiff whole.256 Finally, as far as the legislative history goes, 
not only are the Senate and House Committee Reports clear that the 
remedial provisions were to be interpreted broadly, but Michael Gordon, 
a chief architect of ERISA as a congressional staffer in the 1970s,257 has 
written, “[Justice] Scalia is off the mark in holding fast to the myth that 
the ERISA authors only intended to enact ‘typical’ equitable remedies 
and that they rejected the law-equity merger process, then at its peak.”258 
All in all, and as Professor Langbein persuasively puts it, ERISA 
was meant to “replicate the core principles of trust remedy law, including 
the make-whole standard of relief.”259 The time has certainly come for 
 
consequential damages under § 502(a)(3) is plainly in order.”). 
 254. In this regard, one of the more bizarre aspects of both Great-West and Sereboff was the almost 
complete absence of any mention of the importance of protecting the plan benefits promised to plan 
participants. Of course, the plaintiffs in these cases were insurance companies seeking reimbursement 
from participants, see Great-W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 207–09 (2002); 
Sereboff v. Mid. Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 359–61 (2006), so maybe the Court was 
disinclined to place these policy issues into the mix. That fact may also make it easier for future courts 
to distinguish participant and beneficiary cases (relying on the Varity model) from insurance company 
subrogation and reimbursement cases (relying on the Mertens model). But see Amschwand, 505 F.3d at 
347 (“Amschwand’s proposed distinction among defendants has been rejected by many of our sister 
circuits. There is no textual argument for drawing this distinction under § 502(a)(3). Under Great-
West, only the nature of the claim and the relief sought—not the status of the litigants—determine the 
scope of available § 502(a)(3) recovery.”). 
 255. Russell, 437 U.S. at 153 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 256. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 257. See Mary Williams Walsh, Pensions: Big Holes in the Net, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 2005, at G1.  
 258. See Medill, supra note 103, at 580–81 (citing e-mail from Michael Gordon in Eccles & 
Gordon, supra note 204). Gordon has been widely recognized as one of the most influential 
Congressional staffers during the enactment of ERISA and as minority counsel to the Senate 
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare from 1970–1975. Id. at 15–16 & n.c. He is reported to have 
played a role in nearly every political issue addressed during ERISA’s enactment. See id. at 15 n.c. 
 259. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 224 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting 
Langbein, supra note 3, at 1319). 
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the Court to “revisit what is an unjust and increasingly tangled ERISA 
regime.”260 
IV.  Legislative Fixes: Proposed Sections 3(43) and 502(a)(11) 
Additionally, Congress should reevaluate section 502(a)(3) and 
interpret it to provide remedies that will more likely meet ERISA’s 
primary goals of protecting employees’ benefits. In this vein, Congress 
should provide a definition for “appropriate equitable relief” in section 
502(a)(3) and, more dramatically, add language similar to that of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991,261 and permit capped compensatory and 
punitive damages under ERISA in certain types of cases. This Part 
considers each of those possibilities. 
A. Amending the Remedial Language of Section 502(a)(3) 
To better provide protection for employees’ benefits, Congress 
should amend ERISA to more specifically define the nature of the 
equitable relief available under section 502(a)(3).262 Additionally, so that 
these remedies are not limited to scenarios where other remedies under 
section 502(a)(1)(B) for benefits or section 502(a)(2) are otherwise not 
available, additional language should be added to define the relationship 
between section 502(a)(3) and the other remedial sections. 
More specifically, ERISA section 3, the definitional section, should 
be amended to add proposed section 3(43) to define the phrase 
“appropriate equitable relief” in section 502(a)(3). The idea here would 
be to provide a definition based on familiar equitable language found in 
other federal employment law statutes. In fact, in the Mertens decision, 
the majority acknowledged that the Court in the past had used similar 
equitable language in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.263 
Consistent with some lower federal courts,264 this reference to 
similar remedial language in Title VII forms the basis for the definition 
set forth in proposed section 3(43), and makes it possible by extension 
 
 260. See id. at 222 (quoting DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 453 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(Becker, J., concurring)). 
 261. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2006).  
 262. This amendment should expressly state that it only applies to single-employer plans under 
ERISA. Both multiemployer plans (involving union trust funds) and multiple employer plans (involving 
the pooling of resources of smaller employers) raise other important issues not addressed by this Article 
and should be considered separately to determine whether these new provisions should apply to them. 
 263. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255 (1993) (“And though we have never interpreted 
the precise phrase ‘other appropriate equitable relief[]’ [in ERISA,] we have construed the similar 
language of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (before its 1991 amendments) . . . .”); see also 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006). But see Great-W. Life & Annuity Ins. 
Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 218–19 n.4. (2002) (making a textualist argument that back pay is not 
actually a form of equitable relief under Title VII). 
 264. See, e.g., Strom v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 202 F.3d 138, 145–47 (2d Cir. 1999). 
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for ERISA plaintiffs to obtain make-whole relief in appropriate cases.265 
That section would simply state: “The term ‘appropriate equitable relief’ 
means the same type of equitable relief available under section 706(g)(1) 
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” 
Section 706(g)(1), in turn, states in pertinent part: 
[T]he court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful 
employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be 
appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or 
hiring of employees, with or without back pay . . . , or any other 
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.266 
Over the years, this language has been interpreted to allow for a 
wide range of equitable remedies, including various forms of “make-
whole” relief such as reinstatement, back pay, and front pay.267 Such a 
provision would also have the advantage of relying on an established 
provision that has been consistently interpreted over the years. 
At the same time, an additional sentence should be added to 
proposed section 3(43) to make clear that the awarding of equitable 
relief under section 502(a)(3) does not require that there be no relief 
available under any other remedial sections, as the Varity case currently 
suggests.268 This is especially important for denial of benefits claims that 
include requests for consequential damages. In this regard, the second 
sentence of this proposed section should read: “Relief under section 
502(a)(3) does not require that there be no other relief available under 
other provisions of section 502(a), only that the relief be ‘appropriate’ for 
the harm suffered by the plaintiff.” 
This second sentence is an important addition also because of 
judicial developments in the case of LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & 
Associates, Inc.269 Although the holding of the case is that individual 
401(k) account holders can sue to make their accounts whole for 
wrongful conduct under section 502(a)(2),270 there was an attempt by 
Chief Justice Roberts in his concurrence to limit access to relief under 
 
 265. Accord Langbein, supra note 3, at 1319 (“Congress . . . intended ERISA to replicate the core 
principles of trust remedy law, including the make-whole standard of relief.”). 
 266. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(g)(1). 
 267. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters, & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 572 (1990); see 
also Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 197 (1974). 
 268. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 515 (1996). 
 269. 128 S. Ct. 1020 (2008). 
 270. Id. at 1026. I initially believed that the Court would also decide whether LaRue could bring 
his breach of fiduciary claim under section 502(a)(3) for “appropriate equitable relief.” See Posting of 
Paul Secunda to Workplace Prof Blog, Reflections on the LaRue Decision, http:// 
lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog/2008/02/reflections-on.html (Feb. 20, 2008). Although that 
was the provision under which LaRue filed his case, the Court decided that it was not necessary to 
address issues about whether make-whole relief was available under section 502 (a)(3) in order to 
come to a decision in the case. Larue, 128 S. Ct. at 1023. 
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502(a)(2).271 Specifically, Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Kennedy, 
questioned whether relief could be had under section 502(a)(2) before a 
plaintiff goes through the more tricky procedural roller coaster of a 
denial of benefits claim under section 502(a)(1)(B).272 The argument is 
that the LaRue case is really not a fiduciary breach case under section 
502(a)(2), but rather a denial of benefits case under section 502(a)(1)(B), 
subject to exhaustion and Firestone discretion.273 Consequently, the 
concurrence suggests that lower federal courts in the future should 
consider whether section 502(a)(1)(B) applies in a case like this and, if 
so, whether there must be exhaustion of internal remedies before the 
section 502(a)(2) issue is reached, if at all. 
Although it is highly doubtful that LaRue is a benefits case being 
mischievously recast as a fiduciary one,274 to the extent lower federal 
courts follow Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence, it has the potential to 
undermine the holding of the LaRue majority and further restrict 
remedial relief for ERISA plaintiffs. Combined with the language in 
Varity that suggests that “appropriate” in “appropriate equitable relief” 
means that section 502(a)(3) relief is only available if no other remedy 
exists,275 the presence of the second sentence in proposed section 3(43) is 
imperative. 
B. The ERISA Civil Rights Act: Section 502(a)(11) 
In addition to the proposed section 3(43) amendment, Congress 
should attack the intersectionality problem in ERISA by making a 
legislative move that it has previously made in the employment-
discrimination law context. To the extent that reinstatement, back pay, 
and other equitable “make-whole relief” is insufficient to provide 
adequate relief caused by denials of benefits, breaches of fiduciary duty, 
or wrongful discharges,276 Congress could pass an ERISA Civil Rights 
 
 271. Id. at 1026 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 272. Id.  
 273. Id. at 1026–27 (“If LaRue may bring his claim under § 502(a)(1)(B), it is not clear that he may 
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 274. The problem with Chief Justice Roberts’s argument is that there were no benefits to be had. 
In a 401(k) plan, a participant is only entitled to his account balance, which LaRue had already 
received. See Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss the Writ at 2, LaRue, 128 S. Ct. 1020 (No. 06-856) 
(“[W]hile the case was still pending before the Fourth Circuit, [LaRue] withdrew all of his funds from 
his account.”) LaRue first needed to establish that there had been a breach of fiduciary duty in order 
to get his lost earnings into the plan before he could make a claim for benefits. It would help in these 
cases if Congress would clarify that circumstances involving both a breach of fiduciary duty and a 
claim for benefits can be combined into one suit. 
 275. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 515 (1996). 
 276. Consider the pitfalls of solely relying on reinstatement or back pay for these types of claims. 
Reinstatement is often impossible because by the time it is ordered, the employee has long since taken 
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Act based on the Civil Rights Act of 1991.277 Importantly, such legislation 
would permit ERISA plaintiffs to receive consequential damages in 
appropriate cases. This is significant because equitable relief, even when 
including back pay and other make-whole relief, does not compensate 
for the significant consequential damages of job loss or loss of benefits 
(e.g., health insurance expenses, mortgage foreclosure, family disruption 
caused by inability to pay school expenses, or the necessity of moving the 
family to take a new job).278 
A reconsideration of the Corcoran case from Part II, in which Mrs. 
Corcoran lost her baby because of a benefits determination by her 
managed care company, illustrates the problem with merely relying on 
an expanded equitable relief definition. In Corcoran,279 Mrs. Corcoran 
had to settle for the value of the hospital services she was denied under 
section 502(a)(1)(B) and was not able to bring a wrongful death claim for 
the death of her child because that claim was preempted under the 
holding of Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux.280 
Under the proposed amendment to section 3(43), a future Mrs. 
Corcoran might be able to obtain “make-whole” relief under an 
expanded definition of equity under section 502(a)(3). Yet, although her 
economic loss would be addressed, it is unclear how Mrs. Corcoran can 
receive the relief she deserves for pain and suffering without the ability 
to receive substantial consequential damages, in the form of both 
compensatory and punitive damages, for the loss of her child. In short, 
only the addition of monetary damages in the form now available under 
employment discrimination laws would serve that need. However, to 
keep this new legislation consistent with the primary purposes of ERISA, 
 
another job. See Charlie J. Morris, A Tale of Two Statutes: Discrimination for Union Activity Under the 
NLRA and RLA, 2 Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol’y J. 317, 338–39 (1998) (citing Elvis C. Stephens & Warren 
Chaney, A Study of the Reinstatement Remedy Under the National Labor Relations Act, 25 Lab. L.J. 31 
(1974)). Even when reinstatement is a possibility, studies indicate that employees may be fired shortly 
after being reinstated for “other” reasons or may just quit because of the hostility they face in the 
workplace. Id. Moreover, years of delay between the wrongful discharge and the reinstatement give 
the employer the benefit of its illegal conduct. As to back pay, the expense of litigation eats up the 
entirety of a back pay award for all but the most highly-compensated employees and thus makes it 
difficult for employees to find legal representation. The Author would like to thank Professor Richard 
A. Bales for these insights.  
 277. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2006). Another version of this idea of combining ERISA’s remedial 
scheme with the capped damage remedies of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 has been suggested by 
Professor Dana Muir. See Dana Muir, ERISA Remedies: Chimera or Congressional Compromise, 81 
Iowa L. Rev. 1, 52 (1995). Professor Muir’s initial insight makes even more sense in light of the 
intervening fourteen years of preemption and remedies cases since her article on section 510 remedies. 
 278. Following Professor Medill’s example, I limit make-whole relief here to “a monetary award 
calculated to restore the plaintiff’s economic losses.” See Medill, supra note 4, at 926. Back pay would 
be one such remedy. On the other hand, I limit compensatory damages to mean a “monetary award 
designed to compensate the plaintiff for physical and emotional pain and suffering.” See id. 
 279. See 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).  
 280. See 481 U.S. 41 (1987); see also supra notes 170–74.  
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these types of damages would only be awarded if available equitable 
relief would not provide a meaningful remedy. Thus, although Mrs. 
Corcoran would be eligible for compensatory damages for pain and 
suffering and punitive damages, if the necessary reckless disregard and 
malice were proven, other plaintiffs like Mr. LaRue and Mr. Dedeaux 
would be limited to appropriate equitable damages unless they could 
show that the wrongful conduct caused consequential damages not 
sufficiently addressed by equitable relief. 
In order to make this distinction more clear, such compensatory 
claims could only be brought under section 502(a)(3) alone or combined 
with section 510. Section 502(a)(3) alone would address claims for denial 
of benefits and breach of fiduciary duties which lead to consequential 
damages, while section 502(a)(3) combined with section 510 would 
address similar claims for relief in the wrongful discharge and retaliation 
context. In order to make these consequential claims consistent with 
employment discrimination law, and not suffer from the same 
enforcement weaknesses associated with current section 510 claims,281 the 
proposed section will require that the plaintiff establish that the 
defendant has the intent to interfere with rights protected by ERISA. 
Focusing eligibility for compensatory and punitive damages on intent 
determinations would have the advantage of being able to use the well-
established proof schemes from employment-discrimination law to ferret 
out the necessary intent from circumstantial evidence.282 
Within these parameters, the proposed ERISA Civil Rights Act 
would mimic the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in important respects. The 
ERISA Civil Rights Act would provide under proposed section 
502(a)(11): 
(a) In an action brought by a complaining party under section 
502(a)(3) alone, or in conjunction with section 510, of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) against a 
respondent who has unlawfully denied benefits, breached fiduciary 
duties, or interfered with the protected rights of an ERISA participant 
or beneficiary, any of which causes consequential damages, the 
complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive damages as 
allowed in subsection (b) of this section, in addition to any appropriate 
 
 281. The weakness of the current section 510 regime is highlighted by the case of McGann v. H & 
H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991). In McGann, an employer reduced the lifetime coverage 
amount under a health plan for HIV/AIDS from $1 million to $5000 after it discovered that one of its 
employees had contracted the disease. Id. at 403. The court reasoned that this was not a discriminatory 
act under section 510 because: (1) there was no promise that the employer would keep the high 
coverage limit forever and the plan contemplated that it could be modified or terminated at any time, 
(2) the change in coverage would apply to all participants and not just to the participant who currently 
had the disease, and (3) ERISA does not prohibit health plan discrimination between or among 
different category of diseases. Id. at 406–08. 
 282. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–05 (1973). 
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relief authorized by section 502(a) of ERISA, from the respondent. 
Plan assets may not be used for the payment of these damages.283 
Subsection (b), in turn, would provide: 
(b) Compensatory and punitive damages. 
(1) Determination of punitive damages 
A complaining party may recover punitive damages under this section 
against a respondent if the complaining party demonstrates that the 
respondent unlawfully denied benefits, breached fiduciary duties, or 
interfered with protected rights under ERISA, with malice or with 
reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved 
individual. 
(2) Exclusions from compensatory damages 
Compensatory damages awarded under this section shall not include 
backpay, interest on backpay, or any other type of equitable relief 
authorized under section 502(a) of ERISA. 
To assuage employers’ concerns about large liability awards, which might 
cause them not to voluntarily sponsor employee benefits plans, the same 
compensatory and punitive damage caps in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
would be implemented. These caps would be based on the size of the 
employer being sued: 
The sum of the amount of compensatory damages awarded under this 
section for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, 
inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other 
nonpecuniary losses, and the amount of punitive damages awarded 
under this section, shall not exceed, for each complaining party— 
(A) in the case of a respondent who has fewer than 101 employees, 
$100,000; 
(B) in the case of a respondent who has more than 100 and fewer than 
201 employees, $200,000; 
(C) in the case of a respondent who has more than 200 and fewer than 
501 employees, $350,000; and 
(D) in the case of a respondent who has more than 500 employees, 
$500,000.284 
Finally, because employees would have the right to sue for 
compensatory and punitive damages, the Seventh Amendment requires 
that plaintiffs under proposed section 502(a)(11)(c) be able to demand a 
jury trial.285 Not only would the ability to have a jury trial be consistent 
 
 283. This last sentence is necessary because it could prove very problematic if a court held that a 
401(k) plan improperly denied benefits and had to satisfy that judgment with plan assets. 
 284. I approximate higher caps here to take inflation into account since the passage of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991. 
 285. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (2006) (providing right to jury trial in employment discrimination 
actions seeking compensatory or punitive damages); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974) 
(interpreting Seventh Amendment right to jury trial to extend to statutory claims that involve “legal 
rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary courts of law”).  
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with the framework of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,286 but it would also 
provide employees and their beneficiaries with the opportunity to 
explain the inequities of their situation to their peers and try to prove 
their right to consequential damages. 
Now, some may object that such a scheme would cause employers to 
no longer sponsor employee benefits plans.287 But this is highly unlikely 
both because of the substantial tax benefits that would be lost by the 
employer and because such employers would be at a competitive 
disadvantage compared to competitor employers who continued to offer 
such benefits plans.288 Additionally, this proposed amendment would 
most likely just cause employers to write their plans even more explicitly 
and give even greater consideration to the denial of a claim. And unlike 
in the Title VII context where plaintiffs can go beyond the damage caps 
by relying on other federal laws, like § 1981,289 or parallel state 
antidiscrimination law,290 the presence of broad federal preemption 
would make the availability of consequential damages beyond the 
designated caps very unlikely. Furthermore, punitive-damage language 
similar to that of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 would mean that the 
proposed amendment would be interpreted under the Kolstad v. 
American Dental Ass’n291 line of cases, with the likely result that punitive 
damages would only be awarded in cases where the employer did not act 
in good faith to comply with ERISA.292 
 
 286. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c). 
 287. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262–63 (1993). 
 288. Another possibility, which would make this problem disappear, is requiring a mandatory pay-
or-play system for employer sponsorship of all employee benefits plans. Such a scheme is currently 
being considered as part of President Obama’s health care reform proposal. See Sarah Barr, Health 
Care: Senate HELP Bill Would Cost $611 Billion; Democrats Unveil More Coverage Provisions, BNA 
Daily Lab. Rep., July 6, 2009, at A-8 (“The employer mandate included in the amendment would 
require employers with 25 or more employees to offer adequate insurance coverage and contribute at 
least 60 percent to the cost of monthly premiums—or face a penalty. Employers would be charged 
$750 annually for each full-time employee and $375 annually for each part-time employee without 
coverage, a provision that would generate $52 billion over 10 years, according to CBO and the Joint 
Committee on Taxation.”). 
 289. See 42 U.S.C. 1981 (2006).  
 290. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Dissecting Damages: An Empirical Exploration of Sexual 
Harassment Awards, 3 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 1, 4–5 (2006) (discussing circumvention of Title VII 
damage caps through state law causes of action).  
 291. 527 U.S. 526 (1999) (consistent with 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1), holding that employment 
discrimination plaintiffs may seek punitive damages where an employer has engaged in 
“discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of 
an aggrieved individual.”). Under Kolstad, the focus is “on whether an employer discriminated against 
an employee in the face of a perceived risk that its actions would violate federal law.” See Paul M. 
Secunda, A Public Interest Model For Applying Lost Chance Theory To Probabilistic Injuries In 
Employment Discrimination Cases, 2005 Wis. L. Rev. 747, 778 n.184. 
 292. Id. at 545 (“[I]n the punitive damages context, an employer may not be vicariously liable for 
the discriminatory employment decisions of managerial agents where these decisions are contrary to 
the employer’s ‘good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII.’” (quoting Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 
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Perhaps most importantly, and the best response to potential critics, 
is that the availability of meaningful remedies for plaintiffs under the law 
would finally act as an effective deterrent against employers, plan 
administrators, and insurance companies wrongfully denying or delaying 
benefits for employees, breaching fiduciary duties, and wrongfully 
discharging employees for exercise of their rights under ERISA.293 In the 
end, because of the availability of consequential damages, ERISA’s 
primary purpose of protecting employee benefits would more likely be 
vindicated. 
Conclusion 
The current unsatisfactory state of affairs for employee participants 
and their beneficiaries under ERISA is not a consequence of litigation 
tactics or what is wrought by a proper interpretation of ERISA, but can 
better be attributed to ERISA’s intersectionality problem of broad 
preemption and limited remedies. It is at this intersection of the 
interpretation of ERISA’s preemption and remedial provisions that the 
Court has been most effective in shielding employers from employee 
benefits liability. 
To rectify this situation, this Article proposes a number of different 
solutions from both judicial and legislative perspectives. Judicially, the 
Supreme Court should embrace the remedial nature of ERISA and find 
that equitable relief may include “make whole” relief available in other 
employment statutes and, more generally, under the common law of 
trusts. Additionally, Congress should add a new definitional section, 
proposed section 3(43), to define “appropriate equitable relief,” which 
would expand the relief available under section 502(a)(3) and turn that 
section into a true “catch-all” regardless of what other relief is available 
under other provisions of section 502(a). Finally, to restore fairness to 
the most harsh case outcomes under ERISA, this Article proposes 
adding section 502(a)(11), which would provide recovery of capped 
compensatory and punitive damages in those cases that require 
consequential damages for employees to receive an effective remedy. 
In short, only by undertaking to provide these types of expanded 
remedies will ERISA once more become an employee security act and 
cease being a shelter from legal accountability for unscrupulous 
employers, plan administrators, and other fiduciaries.294 
 
139 F.3d 958, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Tatel, J., dissenting))). 
 293. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 515 (1996) (noting that a 502(a)(3) claim for individual 
relief for breach of fiduciary duty would be important deterrent against wrongful conduct by fiduciaries). 
 294. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 223 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“‘gaping 
wound’ caused by the breadth of preemption and limited remedies under ERISA, as interpreted by this 
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